Pz Gr Dv GrossDeutschland - the defensive battle of Targul Frumos 2-5 May 1944, according to C/O Generalleutnant Hasso von Manteuffel - a thread #WW2 #GD

The preceding weeks to this action had seen the Soviet forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under Marshall Konev, enter Rumania, taking Jassy and the strategically important Targul Frumos (TF). GrossDeutschland (GD) were ordered to retake the town. /2

By the night 10/11 April, GD had successfully retaken TF, w/ fighting continuing as the Division & supporting units pushed on, driving the Soviets further north. Eventually, a new front formed & GD prepared defensive positions in the re-won ground north of TF (see Tweet 1) /3

During this period of preparation, FW Röger, I Bt, Pz Fü Rgt, GD won the RK for an incredible action. He & one other disguised themselves as shepherds & drove sheep thru Soviet positions to recce. He even conversed w/ them, then went on to blow a bridge & fought his way back! /4

Meanwhile, the men of GD improved their defences & waited for the inevitable Soviet counterattack. Air recon saw massed tanks, infantry & new artillery positions. Manteuffel requested Hans Rudel’s unit move into the area on 1 May & they attacked the areas of Soviet build up. /5

Manteuffel reported approx bayonet strength of the Division as;

x2 Mot Inf Rgts (Gr & Fü) each w/ x2 Btls of x4 Kps each. 100 men per Kp = 1,600 men

1 Btl of heavy weapons

Pioniere Btl at full-strength

1 Recon Btl at 2/3s strength

/6

Assault gun (STuG) Btl w/ c.40 guns

Pz Rgt w/ 1 Btl Pz IVs - c. 40 tanks
2 Btl of Panthers - c. 80 tanks
1 Btl of Tigers - c. 40 tanks

Artillery Rgt of 3 Btl w/ full complement of guns

AA Btl w/ 3 batteries of 88s

He notes ‘ample stocks of munitions & fuel’

/7

‘The Div was well supplied w/ comms equipment (radio & field telephones)....painstaking effort went into creating an efficient signals net....Almost all telegraph lines were destroyed by enemy fire on the first day of the attack’

/8

Of neighbouring units, the 3SS Totenkopf on the L was regarded v. highly & this was reciprocated. The 46ID on the R were a ‘good Division under a good commander & could be relied on when the going got rough!’ The Rumanian units, behind in support were viewed ‘a burden upon us’ /9

The terrain north of TF was perfect for AFVs but also a wide defensive field of fire. Ground cover afforded camouflage to GDs prepared infantry, heavy weapon & assault gun positions.

The infantry Rgts were in the HKL (main battle line) in depth, w/ strong local reserves. /10

The STuGs were distributed amongst the infantry Rgts along with the artillery.

Div reserve were the Pioniere & Recce Btls & the powerful Pz Rgt. 1 of the 4 flak batteries was in AT role, the remainder AA. /11

The infantry had dug in well, as Manteuffel ordered w/ mixed kampfgruppen in a defensive zone for mutual fire support. All stellung (positions) were approved by Rgt c/o & approved by Manteuffel. No further changes were allowed. Manteuffel held briefings as low as Kp c/o

/12

Manteuffel - ‘As a result of these pep talks the unit leaders, all of whom were close friends w/ each other, were briefed thoroughly. I make a point of emphasising this as the interaction of all weapons & supporting functioned in such an exemplary manner....’ /13

‘.....the only other place one could find an example of such co-operation would be in textbooks.’

Manteuffel was most concerned about the use of his strong Pz Rgt. This was discussed with his ‘outstanding officer corps’, w/ it being decided to use as a mobile reserve. /14

Once this was decided, detail was such that each Kp had pre-planned routes to all their possible support locations, so zug c/o’s had u/standing of the terrain, which decided their battle tactics. /15

Manteuffel predicted the Soviet plan ‘....with a probability bordering on certainty...’ of massed armour assault w/ strong supporting artillery. The dug-in Inf Rgts/arty/STuGs would need to hold this onslaught, to allow the mobile Pz reserve to destroy the enemy. /16

In the preceding counter-attack/area battles when GD re-took TF, they had encountered for the first time the IS2. An unpleasant realisation for them when they inspected knocked-out examples with the new 122mm gun & shells being in 2 parts. /17

So, the men of the Gren & Füs Rgts knew they would have to weather the storm until the Pz’s arrived - Manteuffel ‘In my comments I left no doubt that they would have to defend themselves, as our Pz’s could not be everywhere....’ /18

Manteuffel’s Div command post was ideally located on a rise due south of TF w/ the whole combat sector in sight. Thus, the painstaking effort of the prepared positions and pre-tested fire plans for h.weapons, AT, arty & STuGs could be seen.

/19

Manteuffel - ‘In spite of the most careful preparations, the DECISIVE factor in defence was the combat potential of the troops. It was this which allowed the defence to achieve the result it did : a huge fiasco for the Russians! /20

Despite Manteuffel’s hubris, it was known that when Soviet commanders became aware they faced GD, hurried communiques to Stavka were made. GD was a respected & feared adversary.

There was a price to pay tho in return for receiving the best men & kit. GD were Die Feuerwehr /21

The Soviet assault commenced 2 May w/ arty @0400hrs. The care in concealing the positions benefited as men/equip losses were low. Tanks (c.40) advanced an hour later & the inf allowed themselves to be part overrun to enable the 88s to engage & the Pz’s in their assembly area /22

The Gren Rgt then faced tanks from NW (see tweet 1). Supported by STuGs c.30 tanks were destroyed along w/ 15 by the Pz reserve who saw them advance thru a disintegrating Rumanian unit on the L. By 0800 waves of tanks were destroyed by the well-sited firing positions /23

Manteuffel who was actively directing events was fired on from 3kms away by heavy tanks. At first he thought it a mistake by his own Tigers but realised it was the new IS2. A Kp of Tigers engaged but were ineffective at that range, advancing & knocking them out at 1.8/2kms /24

By 1100hrs c.250 Russian tanks were destroyed in the Pz Gren area, mainly by the Pz Rgt reserve. Here the assault slackened. Concerning reports tho, were recd from the Füs Rgt in the NE area from 0900. With the Pz Rgt reserves in the NW of TF, the Füs were fighting alone. /25

A large no. of tanks had penetrated the Füs Rgt lines w/ 30+ in the village where the Rgt command post was located. 24 were destroyed in close quarters w/ Rgt c/o Oberst Niemack taking part. The Füs had separated the Soviet infantry/tanks but the situation was critical /26

Manteuffel promised Niemack support from the Pz Rgt by 1200hrs & 2 Btls of Pz’s arrived, deploying straight into the chaotic heavy fighting, destroying 30+ Soviet tanks in the Füs Rgt’s rear area. The intervention was timely & the R flank was secured by nightfall. /27

The night 2/3 May saw half Btls Panthers/Tigers deployed to each Inf sector in support. Manteuffel hoped the back had been broken of Soviet armour’s ‘extraordinary losses’. Attacks recd on 2 & 3 May were repulsed with further heavy losses, supported by Rudel’s AT Geschwader /28

Manteuffel records GDs tank losses were less than 10 with a considerable no. with minor/medium damage. No drop in strength was seen, attributed to a superb supply/ repair infrastructure. Remaining ‘the courageous infantry’s faithful helper’.

/29

Manteuffel goes on ‘....the enemy’s losses in men/tanks were so great they lost desire to attack as long as Pz Gr Div GD was in position. I estimate their losses at c.350 tanks destroyed & 200 damaged.’ /30

Manteuffel’s view on this hard-fought defensive success was exhaustive, but summarised as;

‘The Div had to defend, which meant hold its positions, there was to be no fighting withdrawal & this was made clear to the common soldier, otherwise the infantry Gruppenführer...’. /31

‘....would believe he was entitled to fight a delaying action & withdraw temporarily. The closest possible cooperation between infantry & all arms that supported it (own heavy weapons, StuGs, arty & pioneer) were the foundation but also played first violin in the concert....’ /32

‘....with all other weapons submitting to their legitimate demands.’

Re the critical role of the Pz Rgt....

‘The Pzs were to be held together, close to the front to counter attack enemy armour & all weapons subordinate to them wherever they were committed....’ /33

‘....In this way, these support weapons provided the most effective support to the Pzs & thus, themselves. Frittering away of Pzs had to be avoided no matter what the circumstances so as not to weaken its core. The Pz should not be satisfied with fending off enemy tanks....’ /34

‘....from firing positions, rather they should engage & destroy enemy armour wherever seen/suspected. Inc. attacking enemy tanks supporting from long range. Fire & movement must be used vs tanks to prevent being ambushed by enemy reserves who have located....’ /35

‘.....the firing position.’ Commit only enough Pzs to the defence as is needed to master the situation. The Pz battle MUST be conducted in depth, that is to say that a reserve of Pzs must always be ready for action, especially those with large calibre weapons.’ /36

There ends Manteuffel’s account.

By the 5 May, the Soviet attack was spent & apart from localised (hard) combat the front remained largely quiet until the end of May of which GD took advantage with reorganisation, limited rest, refit & taking in sorely needed replacements. /37

GD had withstood an attack by several hundred tanks & a number of rifle divisions. The cost was high though, by way of example with the II Btl Pz Gr Rgt GD being tactically disbanded due to its weakened combat strength & particularly officers & NCOs. /38

Soon, Pz Gr Div Grossdeutschland will transfer north to East Prussia & the Baltics in a counter attack to support Armee Gruppe Kurland.

They truly were the Wehrmacht’s Feuerwehr!

Thank you for reading!

/Ende