My Friday provocation - which I know is not widely shared in Brexit twitter circles - is that the UK government has been structured wrongly on Brexit since 2016 and the appointment of Lord Frost compounds the error. Not about personalities but balance of roles... 1/
So in the usual UK government system departments set policy and implement it, and the centre of government (Cabinet Office, Number 10) coordinates, arbitrates, sets overall strategy, and all the other things you'd expect from a centre. Though without much resource tbf... 2/
For international policy there was always a Prime Minister's 'sherpa' who was also the head of a Cabinet Office secretariat, their role to represent the PM at various international meetings, drawing on all different departmental interests. A specific and limited role perhaps. 3/
Now we come to Brexit and how to handle this. The May government does two things - sets up the Department for Exiting the EU, and appoints Olly Robbins as sherpa. But steadily Robbins becomes the chief negotiator, leaving DexEU as a sort of coordinating department 4/
Essentially with Robbins the centre of government becomes the implementer of Brexit. That means there is no separate arbiter between different interests, for although cross government consultation is done, ultimately all the power comes to one person. 5/
In many ways the original UK negotiating structure does not work, not least as there is never internal harmony on the UK side as to the negotiating objectives. Exactly the sort of thing an arbiter function like the traditional Cabinet Office would have done. 6/
Under Johnson we have David Frost appointed as the negotiator / sherpa and clear centre of power, with his own task force, reporting directly to the PM. Again it means he is the implementer, and there is no real arbiter or attempt to assemble all interests. 7/
Net effect - UK negotiating approach is one dimensional - not considering all our interests. Nobody can speak up against Frost, except in limited circumstances, Michael Gove. Two negotiations in which we fail to get a good deal follow. As is now clear. 8/
A new opportunity emerges after Brexit negotiations are complete, to go back to the normal UK government structure of a lead department and central coordination. But instead we go the other way, and give the centre even stronger power. Doubling down. 9/
But we already see the tensions. Frost wants to stick to the letter of the text, while departments are under pressure from their stakeholders e.g. farmers in Defra, performers DCMS. Meanwhile FCDO run EU Member State embassies, but the centre has overall EU policy. 10/
The centre of government does not have the resources of departments to deliver major policies. And the tendency is to shortcut that work and just say what goes. Which is what has happened. And it hasn't delivered a good result for the UK on Brexit issues. 11/
EU negotiations are tough and need cross government effort. But so are US negotiations. International talks are a contact sport as a wise man once said. They need the best government structures, not some central diktat led hybrid. Shouting in the wind, but all said now... 12/ end
PS on UK structure for EU relations, @jillongovt has some questions. https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-uk-sets-up-eu-relations-coordination-machinery-but-questions-remain/