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Some puzzling features of moral/political/legal discourse.
+what these puzzles might teach us about the underlying motives at play.
(Partly inspired by impeachment trial. But I’ll use a lot of other examples too.)
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+what these puzzles might teach us about the underlying motives at play.
(Partly inspired by impeachment trial. But I’ll use a lot of other examples too.)
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What makes these puzzles especially noteworthy:
They don’t just *subtly* influence our moral/politics/legal rhetoric (as is typical w/ “motivated reasoning”).
Rather, they are treated as normative. (I.e. we don’t eschew them even when we are made aware.)
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They don’t just *subtly* influence our moral/politics/legal rhetoric (as is typical w/ “motivated reasoning”).
Rather, they are treated as normative. (I.e. we don’t eschew them even when we are made aware.)
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The 3 (not unrelated) puzzles I will discuss:
We talk as if...
-there isn’t ambiguity/tradeoffs (when clearly is)
-reason dictates x. When x is dictated by reason+axiom y, where y is not dictated by “reason”
-all that matters is internal consistency
(I will expound.)
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We talk as if...
-there isn’t ambiguity/tradeoffs (when clearly is)
-reason dictates x. When x is dictated by reason+axiom y, where y is not dictated by “reason”
-all that matters is internal consistency
(I will expound.)
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To start:
We consider it perfectly acceptable to treat any of several possible readings of an ambiguous statement as if its the only reasonable interpretation.
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We consider it perfectly acceptable to treat any of several possible readings of an ambiguous statement as if its the only reasonable interpretation.
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Like if the constitution (or legal precedent or bible or...) can be read one of two ways, we consider it totally reasonable for someone to argue “they believe” one of those ways is “the right” reading.
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We treat such a belief as “reasonable”, regardless of which of the two possible readings it is. So long as its a *possible* reading.
And then we allow them to maintain, not just that it’s *a possible* reading, but that it’s *the only* possible reading.
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And then we allow them to maintain, not just that it’s *a possible* reading, but that it’s *the only* possible reading.
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That is we allow people to treat “possible” as “necessary.”
(Leaving us in the odd predicament where two “possible” readings are each being treated as “necessary”, and both mutually exclusive treatments are then treated as “reasonable”.)
Weird, no?
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(Leaving us in the odd predicament where two “possible” readings are each being treated as “necessary”, and both mutually exclusive treatments are then treated as “reasonable”.)
Weird, no?
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It’s as if we asked:
“Tell me an even number between 2 and 8” and we accepted as “reasonable” the answers “only 4” and “only 6.”
Yes “4” is a reasonable answer. And so is “6”. But “only 4”? (And two statements that are mutually exclusive?)
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“Tell me an even number between 2 and 8” and we accepted as “reasonable” the answers “only 4” and “only 6.”
Yes “4” is a reasonable answer. And so is “6”. But “only 4”? (And two statements that are mutually exclusive?)
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Consider the question of whether it’s “constitutional” to impeach an ex-president.
Now maybe there is some ambiguity (b/c the constitution doesn’t explicitly say? And that exact case hasn’t been brought before scotus?)
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Now maybe there is some ambiguity (b/c the constitution doesn’t explicitly say? And that exact case hasn’t been brought before scotus?)
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Would it then be reasonable to conclude impeachment “is not permitted by the constitution”?
For some reasonable this leap (from “one possible reading is...” to “the constitution necessitates”) is considered legit.
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For some reasonable this leap (from “one possible reading is...” to “the constitution necessitates”) is considered legit.
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(In reality, its *already a stretch* to claim there is ambiguity. Intent of founders+precedent seem pretty clear on this one. But that’s another story.)
Here’s another case:
Does the right to privacy, protected (implicitly?) by the constitution and legal precedent, cover abortions? Campaign finance a form of speech?
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Does the right to privacy, protected (implicitly?) by the constitution and legal precedent, cover abortions? Campaign finance a form of speech?
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Clearly by now this is “settled law.”
But at some point...the constitution clearly never specified either.
At some point SCOTUS had to convert an ambiguous notion of privacy/speech into a non-ambiguous ruling.
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But at some point...the constitution clearly never specified either.
At some point SCOTUS had to convert an ambiguous notion of privacy/speech into a non-ambiguous ruling.
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In that case, did they admit they were doing so? “I hereby decree that...”
Or did they instead justify their ruling on the grounds that their preferred reading was the *only* possible reading?
(I am no con-law expert. But my sense is its almost invariably the latter. No?)
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Or did they instead justify their ruling on the grounds that their preferred reading was the *only* possible reading?
(I am no con-law expert. But my sense is its almost invariably the latter. No?)
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Another example of ignoring ambiguity, and acting as if its totally reasonable to treat one reading as if its the only reading:
(Just something I remember from learning about the Protestant reformation, but seems representative...)
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(Just something I remember from learning about the Protestant reformation, but seems representative...)
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There are apparently two different versions of the Ten Commandments in the old testament.
One that emphasizes idolatry more than the other. (It gets its own commandment.)
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One that emphasizes idolatry more than the other. (It gets its own commandment.)
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Those that were really into destroying all the catholic relics/imagery justified on the basis of one of the versions of the Ten Commandments that happened to emphasize idolatry.
The Catholics and Lutherans, of course, relied on the other version.
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The Catholics and Lutherans, of course, relied on the other version.
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This is just standard cherry picking, I suppose.
But what’s odd: even when its blatant that there was cherry picking (they each brought up the other version in debates), it is considered “reasonable” to hold up your hand-picked cherry and say “this is my reason”.
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But what’s odd: even when its blatant that there was cherry picking (they each brought up the other version in debates), it is considered “reasonable” to hold up your hand-picked cherry and say “this is my reason”.
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So long as you can cite *a source*, that’s a “valid justification”.
No need to *also justify* why you are picking that source over the other.
So long as you have “a source” you can act as if you have a sound justification for believing.
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No need to *also justify* why you are picking that source over the other.
So long as you have “a source” you can act as if you have a sound justification for believing.
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Last example re overlooking ambiguity:
Think back to how you were taught to write essays in high school lit class.
There was some text you read. There were two very different ways to read the text. You were told to take a stand and use the text to justify that stand.
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Think back to how you were taught to write essays in high school lit class.
There was some text you read. There were two very different ways to read the text. You were told to take a stand and use the text to justify that stand.
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So you cherry picked quotes. Even though, by design, there were equally as good quotes to argue the opposite.
Yet it was considered reasonable to cherry pick AND PRETEND LIKE YOU WEREN’T.
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Yet it was considered reasonable to cherry pick AND PRETEND LIKE YOU WEREN’T.
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Like isn’t the “correct” way to read the text that it is ambiguous?
(Otherwise that essay question wouldn’t have been asked.)
But that wasn’t even one of the options for how to respond to the prompt.
(The only correct answer was the one not permitted! Weird, no?)
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(Otherwise that essay question wouldn’t have been asked.)
But that wasn’t even one of the options for how to respond to the prompt.
(The only correct answer was the one not permitted! Weird, no?)
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OK That’s what I mean by overlooking ambiguity. (And considering that an acceptable form of argument.)
Let me turn now to a quite similar phenomena: ignoring tradeoffs.
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Let me turn now to a quite similar phenomena: ignoring tradeoffs.
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Consider the classic moral dilemma:
“Should you steal a life saving pill for your partner, if you can’t afford to buy it?”
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“Should you steal a life saving pill for your partner, if you can’t afford to buy it?”
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My high school was big into “kohlbergian moral-development”.
So they would present us with scenarios like this. And ask us to take a stand and justify the stance. We were scored based on how well we justified.
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So they would present us with scenarios like this. And ask us to take a stand and justify the stance. We were scored based on how well we justified.
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Full marks were given to anyone, as kohlberg would have it, who justified in terms of some abstract principle.
Like “steal the pill because life is sacred” or “don’t steel it because property needs to be protected.”
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Like “steal the pill because life is sacred” or “don’t steel it because property needs to be protected.”
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But why does that get you full marks?
In what world can two mutually exclusive claims both be “valid”?
A world where it suffices to mention one value that’s at play and overlook the fact that there is also another.
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In what world can two mutually exclusive claims both be “valid”?
A world where it suffices to mention one value that’s at play and overlook the fact that there is also another.
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It’s as if someone were to ask you whether a banana was better than an apple, and you responded “bananas are tasty.”
(Yes, and so are apples. But that doesn’t really answer the question.)
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(Yes, and so are apples. But that doesn’t really answer the question.)
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Michael Sandel’s famous Harvard class on “justice” (Lectures Available on YouTube) trains students similarly.
In these YouTube clips, you can see Sandel asking students trolley-like problems (after reading excerpts from philosophers like Bentham).
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In these YouTube clips, you can see Sandel asking students trolley-like problems (after reading excerpts from philosophers like Bentham).
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He asks them: if six are stranded in a lifeboat, is it acceptable to gang up against the weakest among you to have flesh to distribute among the rest. So at least some survive.
That kind of question.
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That kind of question.
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Students raise their hands. Some articulate the logic of why its bad to kill no matter the ends. Others say what matters is the consequences: do more survive that way.
“Good” Sandel responds, whenever *either* of those (mutually exclusive!) arguments are articulated.
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“Good” Sandel responds, whenever *either* of those (mutually exclusive!) arguments are articulated.
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In a math class, would a professor ever answer “good” to two students who give MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE answers?
(No. Something strange is afoot.)
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(No. Something strange is afoot.)
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Of course, this isn’t just Kohlberg or Sandel, or how we amateurs are taught to argue.
Reading Rawls (etc) you get a similar impression.
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Reading Rawls (etc) you get a similar impression.
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Rawls is articulating a theory of justice.
But his theory focuses on one very particular value. Equity. (And a particular way to define/determine it.)
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But his theory focuses on one very particular value. Equity. (And a particular way to define/determine it.)
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But equity is of course just one value. That people may care about. There is also, say, property rights (Nozick, in contrast, focuses on THAT). And efficiency. And...
Why do we act as if articulating one can somehow give you a “theory” of all of justice?
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Why do we act as if articulating one can somehow give you a “theory” of all of justice?
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Why don’t we treat Rawls for what he (I think) is: an articulation of one particular value we might care about (and one particular way to figure out how to best satisfy that value)?
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