Live at 10:30 AM EST: "Deterring PRC Aggression Toward Taiwan."

Follow here for opening statements and witness testimony. https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/deterring-prc-aggression-toward-taiwan

Sen. Talent's opening remarks: The Commission holds this hearing as China’s hostile rhetoric and provocative military actions have created an increasing threat to our partners in Taiwan and throughout the Indo-Pacific. (1/2)

As tensions rise, Taiwan’s ability to deter China from using military force, even with the help of like-minded countries, is more and more uncertain. (2/2)

Sen. Goodwin's opening remarks: As the Commission documented in last year’s Annual Report, the PLA significantly expanded its operations in the air & waters around Taiwan throughout 2020, increasing the chance of a cross-Strait crisis stemming from accident or miscalculation...

...China’s imposition of the national security law in Hong Kong also raised real questions about whether Chinese leaders are now more willing to accept certain risks in the pursuit of their political objectives toward Taiwan, & less concerned about the costs they could incur.

Taiwan is strategically important because it serves as a barrier limiting the PLA’s freedom of movement throughout the Western Pacific, and its vibrant, free political system offers a model for democratizing countries around the world.
—Sen. Goodwin

For these reasons, it has been U.S. govt policy for decades to provide for Taiwan’s defense & stabilize cross-Strait relations...while remaining publicly uncommitted to a particular course of action in the case of a cross-Strait contingency.
—Sen. Goodwin

The PLA has systematically built the capabilities they believe they need for a war with the United States over Taiwan. They probably have achieved initial capability.

—Lonnie Henley @GWtweets

A failed Taiwan landing would not end the war. China would continue the conflict by whatever means available, primarily blockade. The PLA would have the advantage in that extended phase of the conflict even after severe losses.

—Lonnie Henley @GWtweets

The military center of gravity of this conflict is the PLA integrated air defense system in southeast China. If we can disable that, we can win militarily. If not, we probably cannot.

—Lonnie Henley @GWtweets

Cyber ops take aim at the “soft underbelly” of an information-dependent adversary’s military and society.

—Fiona Cunningham @Fiona_Cunning @ElliottSchoolGW

Cyber capabilities are also viewed as the “strategic commanding heights” of future joint operations as they provide linkages both w/in the multi-domain battlespace, & between military conflict & politics, economics, technology and culture.

—Fiona Cunningham @Fiona_Cunning

In general, armed attacks serve as a backstop for the three warfares. In wartime, however, the PLA specifies that psychological operations should be combined with armed attacks to strengthen and expand their effects.

— @Fiona_Cunning

PRC commercial actors might assist the PLA’s information operations with personnel or equipment, likely under the guise of the PRC’s efforts to enhance military-civilian fusion.

— @Fiona_Cunning

Increasing PRC vulnerability to symmetrical, in-kind attacks offers the United States and Taiwan an increasing number of proportionate response options while also increasing the constraints on the PLA to conduct such attacks for fear of blowback.

— @Fiona_Cunning @ElliottSchoolGW

Prioritizing sea denial and ground combat operations will do more to enhance deterrence than investments in any other area.

— @MichaelHunzeker @ScharSchool

A Chinese military campaign short of a full-scale invasion can only succeed at breaking the will of the Taiwanese people to the degree that they believe that Beijing can follow-up an initial attack with something far worse.

— @MichaelHunzeker @ScharSchool

Taiwan does not have enough active duty personnel...The problem is particularly acute in frontline ground combat units, some of which are allegedly at 60% of their authorized end strength.

— @MichaelHunzeker

Yet at least one open source report suggests that Taiwan might only have one-third to one-half of the munitions it will need for just two days of air combat.

— @MichaelHunzeker

Even in a best-case scenario, it will take years to reorient Taiwan’s military toward asymmetric battle concepts after it spent generations planning and preparing for a symmetric war.

— @MichaelHunzeker

Panel 2 kicks off now: Political Calculations Underlying Cross-Strait Deterrence

Cross-Strait deterrence is arguably weaker than at any point since the Korean War.

— @osmastro @FSIStanford @AEIfdp

When will China initiate “armed reunification”? Simply put, Xi Jinping will initiate a conflict with Taiwan to unite with the mainland if he is confident China will succeed.

— @osmastro @FSIStanford @AEIfdp

Xi seems to be ruling over a Chinese population that is losing patience...A recent Global Times poll revealed that around 70% of mainlanders support war to unify Taiwan, and 37% of them think it best if war occurs in three to five years.

— @osmastro @FSIStanford @AEIfdp

US policy needs to focus on shaping Chinese perceptions about their ability to successfully absorb Taiwan through military means.

— @osmastro @FSIStanford @AEIfdp

I believe a hybrid approach of large, concentrated bases in key allied countries with small dispersed bases scattered across informal partners —some within the first island chain and others outside it—is the best path to pursue. (1/2)

— @osmastro @FSIStanford @AEIfdp

In addition to enhancing resiliency, such a force posture would also greatly enhance deterrence because China is more sensitive to threats of horizontal escalation (that other countries would get involved) than vertical escalation (higher levels of force). (2/2)

— @osmastro

The days when the Taiwan military could realistically seek to maintain air and sea superiority in the Taiwan Strait, and to prevail in any limited, conventional conflict with the PLA, are gone and are not coming back. (1/2)

— @kharisborloff @HooverInst

Taiwan’s increasing diplomatic isolation, slowing economy, aging population, and looming fiscal obligations mean that the country can no longer support a military capable of deterring an attack from mainland China using conventional means. (2/2)

— @kharisborloff @HooverInst

Despite facing what is arguably the most serious existential threat in East Asia, Taiwan in 2019 actually spent less on defense as a share of national GDP than every country except Japan.

— @kharisborloff @HooverInst

Revamping and raising the prestige of military service and bolstering the resources available for Taiwan’s defense are difficult political challenges, but ones that, with far-sighted leadership, can be achieved.

— @kharisborloff @HooverInst

Even though Beijing’s confidence in all elements of PRC national power has increased significantly over the past two decades...Chinese political leaders probably remain cautious about the PLA’s ability to execute high-intensity operations.

—Mark Cozad @RANDCorporation

The PLA’s lack of timely real-life experience may not be its biggest issue; rather, its ability to adapt to new situations may be more critical.

—Mark Cozad @RANDCorporation

The PLA recognizes that the United States possesses considerable strength that can be deployed globally with the support of a vast network of global bases, allies, and partners.

—Mark Cozad @RANDCorporation

Beijing believes major power conflicts run the risk of escalation & de-escalation could be extremely difficult....off-ramps might not be readily available, based on the political drivers that led Beijing to decide on using force in the first place.

—Mark Cozad @RANDCorporation

Panel 3 starting: U.S. Policy and Cross-Strait Deterrence

Mid-to-late 2020s may be period of greatest peril for a failure of cross-Strait deterrence...will see trailing edge of a period of mass retirement of late-Cold War-era U.S. platforms, combined w/growth & modernization of PRC’s counter-intervention forces.

— @tshugart3 @CNASdc

China has the world’s only operating bomber production line which has been producing brand-new, long-range aircraft seemingly purpose-built to strike American and allied bases well away from China’s borders, and to overwhelm U.S. carrier strike groups.

— @tshugart3 @CNASdc

By my calculations, from 2015-2019 China launched almost six hundred thousand tons of warships, roughly 50% more than the United States launched over the same time period.

— @tshugart3 @CNASdc

China’s military seems like a force being forged specifically to deter or prevent U.S. military intervention in a scenario such as a cross-Strait conflict.

— @tshugart3 @CNASdc

It is this factor—the desire to avoid uncertainty and ensure the stability of the CCP—and not the prospect of known costs, that is most likely to deter China from engaging in armed conflict.

— @tshugart3 @CNASdc

Japan & Australia rank as the 2 countries most likely to assist the USA militarily in defense of Taiwan, likely allowing the USA to conduct operations from military bases on their territories and potentially contributing their own troops to the fight.

—Bonny Lin @RANDCorporation

India, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, & Vietnam…may try to stay neutral or provide limited assistance, such as intelligence-sharing, support for limited humanitarian military operations, or logistics support.

—Bonny Lin @RANDCorporation

Although regional countries might view an attack as representing Beijing’s increased assertiveness & willingness to use force to achieve objectives, most allies/partners don't view an attack on Taiwan as...significantly threatening their security.

—Bonny Lin @RANDCorporation

Regional allies and partners are likely to view U.S. inaction as a sign of declining U.S. influence and power in the Indo-Pacific and would likely also question how committed the United States is to defend them and other countries.

—Bonny Lin @RANDCorporation

Publicly strengthening & clarifying U.S. commitment to Taiwan would likely only reinforce Chinese planning for U.S. intervention & could strengthen Chinese incentives to strike first against the USA or potential coalition members in a Taiwan contingency.

—Bonny Lin

History matters for both China and Taiwan. It defines their expectations of the U.S. and affects their responses to any steps we might take. U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China has been a precarious balance ever since World War II.

—David Keegan @SAISHopkins

While Beijing says Taiwan & China should “reunify” as if they're 2 halves of a whole that naturally fits together, the 2 sides have gone through dramatically different historical experiences, which would make integration/unification extremely challenging.

—David Keegan

China’s cross-Strait agenda & policy toward U.S. are based on the conclusion that U.S. protection of Taiwan & the ROC since 1945 is the primary reason China hasn't been able to achieve its primary national objective of becoming a fully unified China.

—David Keegan @SAISHopkins

The US-PRC relationship has grown increasingly confrontational since 2008. Where that relationship once lent stability to an unstable and perilous cross-Strait relationship, it now instead adds increasing instability.

—David Keegan @SAISHopkins

Taiwan is the clearest proof that it's possible to govern a Chinese society w/Chinese cultural values as an ethical democracy. Taiwan is a counter to the model of Chinese Communist governance as manifested in the brutal authoritarianism of the PRC.

—David Keegan @SAISHopkins

An unconditional commitment to defend Taiwan would require defining which measures would activate a US response. That would be difficult, and it would signal to Beijing precisely what to do to pressure Taiwan w/out crossing Washington’s “red line.”

—Statement from Shelley Rigger

One of the most confounding aspects of US-Taiwan relations for Americans is the apparent indifference of Taiwanese citizens to the military threat they face. To US policy makers, that threat is the most salient fact about Taiwan.

—Statement from Shelley Rigger

Economically, the US can help Taiwan elevate its economy & avoid economic marginalization by negotiating high-quality agreements with Taipei. The US also should be careful not to make Taiwan collateral damage in its efforts to shape the PRC’s economic practices.

—Shelley Rigger