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1/ @Nicolas Colin asks on @Siftedeu : “why can’t we build more social media giants in Europe?”
Let me tell you the tale of @dailymotion.
Remember them?
They were neck and neck with @YouTube until about 70M UU per month.
Let me tell you the tale of @dailymotion.
Remember them?
They were neck and neck with @YouTube until about 70M UU per month.
2/ DailyMotion was started by two brilliant creative minds: @robertderosny and @Olivier_Poitrey. The guys were blazing new features at speed and leading the way. A real grassroots story.
3/ The product was great, users loved it and we were growing fast.
One of the early good decisions we made was to delay monetisation. We didn’t want to burden a company whose success was predicated on achieving massive scale.
So what happened? Why didn't we become YT?
One of the early good decisions we made was to delay monetisation. We didn’t want to burden a company whose success was predicated on achieving massive scale.
So what happened? Why didn't we become YT?
4/ Let's look structural advantages did YouTube have that allowed them to break away from us
First, they didn’t have to worry so much about being capital efficient. Sequoia backed them early, and Google was around the corner waiting to acquire them. We didn’t have that luxury.
First, they didn’t have to worry so much about being capital efficient. Sequoia backed them early, and Google was around the corner waiting to acquire them. We didn’t have that luxury.
5/ Lack of available capital for a play like this in Europe forced discipline on the infrastructure side. Uniquely amongst video sharing plays, we built our own CDN early, which allowed us to keep bandwidth costs low.
6/ This is one the key reasons we ended surviving, unlike Veoh or Metacafe who got crushed by bandwidth costs. YouTube themselves never got there; but they didn’t have to - Google bought them early and absorbed that cost.
7/ Secondly, YouTube was able to piggy-back MySpace and became their video engine.
The moment adoption on MySpace took off, we saw their numbers improve dramatically
... whereas we kept growing mostly organically, stuck doing deals with MSN or Yahoo :-(
The moment adoption on MySpace took off, we saw their numbers improve dramatically
... whereas we kept growing mostly organically, stuck doing deals with MSN or Yahoo :-(
8/ Thirdly, proximity to the big content owners made deal negotiations easier. Whilst we built a strong team in the US over time led by @JoyMarcus , but this was a much more arduous process for us.
9/ Don’t get me wrong - there were also a lot of self-inflicted wounds here which I have written about before. Rough ride.
The company found its footing under the leadership pf @CedricTournay, who built a real business.
The company found its footing under the leadership pf @CedricTournay, who built a real business.
10/ You can see the structural advantages YouTube enjoyed.
Building a great social media company in Europe will take excellence on product, a willingness to release our cultural orthodoxy around monetisation, and a lot of ambition.
We have all the above; let's go build it.
Building a great social media company in Europe will take excellence on product, a willingness to release our cultural orthodoxy around monetisation, and a lot of ambition.
We have all the above; let's go build it.
11/ Here is the article from @Nicolas_Colin on @Siftedeu - always expanding my thinking 
https://sifted.eu/articles/europe-social-media-startups/
https://sifted.eu/articles/europe-social-media-startups/
