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Operation Desert Storm kicked off on 17 January 1991, following Saddam Hussein's refusal to withdraw from Kuwait.
The massive US-led air offensive lasted 42 days and targeted military and civilian infrastructure across Iraq.
The massive US-led air offensive lasted 42 days and targeted military and civilian infrastructure across Iraq.
The US Air Force quickly overwhelmed the Iraqi Armed Forces with smart bombs, Stealth bombers and Cruise missiles.
A UN survey of civilian damage caused by the US-led air campaign called the aftermath "near apocalyptic". https://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/22/world/after-the-war-un-survey-calls-iraq-s-war-damage-near-apocalyptic.html
A UN survey of civilian damage caused by the US-led air campaign called the aftermath "near apocalyptic". https://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/22/world/after-the-war-un-survey-calls-iraq-s-war-damage-near-apocalyptic.html
At the time, General Merrill McPeak was chief of staff of the US Air Force. I interviewed him for this 
article on the US bombing of the Amiriyah civilian shelter in Baghdad, where 400+ civilians were killed. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/2/13/amiriyah-bombing-30-years-on-no-one-remembers-the-victims
article on the US bombing of the Amiriyah civilian shelter in Baghdad, where 400+ civilians were killed. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/2/13/amiriyah-bombing-30-years-on-no-one-remembers-the-victims
Below is a thread containing interview excerpts that didn't make it into the article. An interesting insight into the thoughts of a man who played an important role in Operation Desert Storm, thirty years after it happened.
McPeak: "According to our information that bunker was the site of a large command and control facility and we attacked it with the view to make Saddam Hussein blind and deathâŠso he could not either receive information or transmit it to and from his forces".
"I never asked the question, I just assumed that this was a military facility. We went to very great lengths to avoid killing civilians in Baghdad."
"If your'e a civilian in Baghdad during those first days of the war, a very good strategy would be to stay home and stay in bed because we did not bomb residential areas, or hospitals, or mosques, or all those places where you might find meetings of civilians."
"I was upset that we stopped bombing. Bombing stopped in Baghdad after that bunker attack. And it stopped because of the feeling, especially by Colin Powell...that it wasnât worth the chances we were taking to continue that bombing."
"They wanted to move the focus of our attacks into the Kuwait sphere of operations and concentrate more heavily on the deployed army.
After that I donât think we attacked again any target that you might call inside downtown Baghdad."
After that I donât think we attacked again any target that you might call inside downtown Baghdad."
"We were sharply restricted on any bombing that came close to urban Baghdad after that attack...we were very sensitive to the charge that we had killed a bunch of civilians...
...and we reacted, in my opinion, in the wrong way. There are going to be civilian casualties in any industrial war."
"Our number on casualties was not 400, it was less than 300...at the time, the damage we thought we had done was something like 250 civilians, thatâs a quibble, because one civilian killed is one too many, but the apology should have come from Saddam Hussein...
...we didnât attack Kuwait, he did, and so the person who put civilians at risk was not us, it was Saddam Hussein."
"I know of no discussion of apologies or compensation. It was a dumb thing to do to go into that bunker, if you're a civilian, stay home, you were safe at home in Baghdad. We killed a remarkable small number of people."
"We took extraordinary measures to reduce and keep to a minimum the number of civilian casualties. We should be getting accolades for this, not apologising for it. But if any compensation is due I would knock on the door of the Iraqi government, not the US government".
