On the question of Russia sanctions - and putting on my historian's hat - the following two considerations come to mind. 1) In the short term, sanctions can and do result in a dramatic worsening of relations; 2) in the longer term, they can be useful in changing behaviour.

Let's consider the following interesting example. In 1979 the Soviet leadership considered whether or not to invade Afghanistan. In March 1979, they firmly decided against it, and one of the reasons put forward - I'd argue the crucial reason - was that it would ruin detente.

Of course, by then detente was already on life support but the prospect of a superpower summit (took place in Vienna later that year), plus expectations of breakthroughs in arms control, helped steer the discussion towards non-intervention.

But in December of the same year, Moscow decided to intervene nonetheless, which was partly a reflection of their view that Soviet relations with the West were already so bad that they could hardly get any worse.

This was of course a mistake, insofar as after the invasion the West imposed sweeping economic sanctions, followed by a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. These sanctions did *not* prompt immediate Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

But they did prompt an early search for a way out. Already by 1980 the Soviets were probing around for a graceful exit. There is also indirect evidence that sanctions and general disapprobation were a factor in the Soviet decision *not* to intervene in Poland in 1981.

The relationship worsened dramatically, and in fact tensions became so bad that there was a fear of nuclear war by 1983. How serious this fear was we may never be able to tell and if the war did break out, it would've been a moot point to argue about who started the whole thing.

Be it as it may, Gorbachev's arrival on the scene triggered a serious reassessment in Moscow of its foreign policy priorities. This reassessment cannot be understood except in the context of the Soviet Union's international isolation post-Afghanistan, post-sanctions.

One of the first policy choices Gorbachev made was to quit Afghanistan (in the event, it took another four years to get out). So, the conclusion, then? It's complicated. But it does suggest that to fully grasp the consequences of policy, we may need to look beyond Putin.