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Excited to hear @LawDavF deliver the 12th Annual Kenneth Waltz Lecture in International Relations @SIWPSColumbia @ColumbiaSIPA
The title of the lecture is 'Nuclear Scripts: Stories of War and Deterrence'.
LF: Of IR theory: "I've always been a bit leery."
LF: Of IR theory: "I've always been a bit leery."
LF: "Waltz followed the logic of his conviction into a contrarian position" which culminated in the Adelphi paper published in 1981 years ago, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better".
LF: Despite the fact there have been no nuclear wars since 1945, there are a number of stories explaining this, on both sides of the argument.
LF: Uses 'scripts' to describe the stories, metanyms, and narratives that "set expectations" in world politics. They rely on analogies and "the lessons of history" and can lead to action and/or confusion.
LF: There are two kinds of scripts: intuitive and deliberate. Deliberate scripts are "more thought through".
LF: Operational war plans can serve this function, detailing a path to implementation, and providing something to be followed and rehearsed.
These scripts are not static, and can and were updated.
These scripts are not static, and can and were updated.
LF: There was a "desperation to find a plausible nuclear script" especially when it came to the notion of extended deterrence, a key aspect of alliance coherence.
Scripts such as flexible response, and the promise of the nuclear umbrella, suffered from a lack of credibility.
Scripts such as flexible response, and the promise of the nuclear umbrella, suffered from a lack of credibility.
LF: Waltz believed that the horrific devastation entailed in any use if nuclear weapons would reinforce the deterrent effect. The "tragic image of escalation" always lead decision makers to see "nuclear calamity" as the ultimate result. Therefore all war should be avoided.
LF: Kennedy acutely felt the dangers of "miscalculations" and "escalation" and this shaped his approach, especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
He feared the "standard scripts" would lead to escalation that would lead to a strategic nuclear exchange.
He feared the "standard scripts" would lead to escalation that would lead to a strategic nuclear exchange.
LF: "It is telling that we keep returning to the Cuban Missile Crisis". We have never seen anything like it since.
We are now aware of several "alternative scripts" and it is noteworthy that "Cuba fed into later scripts".
We are now aware of several "alternative scripts" and it is noteworthy that "Cuba fed into later scripts".
LF: The use of 'escalation will lead to WWIII' was has been used before (Korea) and after (Kosovo).
While nukes might be a reason to avoid war, preventing a country from obtaining nukes might be a reason for going to war.
While nukes might be a reason to avoid war, preventing a country from obtaining nukes might be a reason for going to war.
LF: Indeed, a country with nuclear weapons, contrary to Waltz's thesis, might be more likely to be warlike, not necessarily with other nuclear powers, but might be confident to fight others.
LF: Waltz himself recognized the major difference between a bipolar and multipolar system when it comes to nuclear deterrence.
LF: Many of the weapons and concepts used in nuclear strategy have not changed in decades. There has been continuity.
There has also been a "continuity of non-use".
But this means that any use of nuclear weapons would be done "without any scripts".
There has also been a "continuity of non-use".
But this means that any use of nuclear weapons would be done "without any scripts".
LF: Things are changing, though: new scripts are emerging due to things like proliferation and cyber, etc.
There is no guarantee, therefore, that Waltz's notion that "more is better" will necessarily lead to another "75 years of nuclear peace".
There is no guarantee, therefore, that Waltz's notion that "more is better" will necessarily lead to another "75 years of nuclear peace".
The discussant for the lecture is the venerable Richard Betts.
RB: Scripts are reminiscent of "myths and legends". Many today assume a certain "nonchalance" about their stabilizing effect.
What scripts will shape our and others' understanding of nuclear strategy?
RB: Scripts are reminiscent of "myths and legends". Many today assume a certain "nonchalance" about their stabilizing effect.
What scripts will shape our and others' understanding of nuclear strategy?
LF: Scripts are than myths and legends; they have to be "internalized".
The idea of extended deterrence has prevented a proper interrogation of some nuclear scripts, such as "no first use". NATO and others just avoid dealing with the contradictions.
The idea of extended deterrence has prevented a proper interrogation of some nuclear scripts, such as "no first use". NATO and others just avoid dealing with the contradictions.
LF: "The problem with nuclear weapons is that they exist." Many of the previous scripts have largely been concerned with avoiding their use. We should not be confident that this will continue.
