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Now online @MileEndInst: the first of two blog posts summarising the key findings of my new @HansardSociety Parliamentary Affairs article, which asks "Did Theresa May kill the war powers convention?":
https://www.qmul.ac.uk/mei/news-and-opinion/items/how-not-to-kill-a-constitutional-convention-theresa-mays-intervention-in-syria-april-2018--dr-james-strong.html
https://www.qmul.ac.uk/mei/news-and-opinion/items/how-not-to-kill-a-constitutional-convention-theresa-mays-intervention-in-syria-april-2018--dr-james-strong.html
In the article ( https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab001), I ask how Prime Minister May was able to take military action in Syria in 2018 without prior parliamentary approval.
In this first blog post, I draw on work by @LagassePhilippe and others as well as my own earlier analyses (e.g. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1369148117745767) to flesh out the constitutional questions raised by May's actions.
I posit that May's actions reflected one of three possibilities:
1. I was wrong to argue that a new war powers convention evolved between 2003 and 2015 ( https://doi.org/10.1111%2F1467-856X.12055).
2. May killed the convention.
3. May followed the convention, perhaps amending it along the way.
1. I was wrong to argue that a new war powers convention evolved between 2003 and 2015 ( https://doi.org/10.1111%2F1467-856X.12055).
2. May killed the convention.
3. May followed the convention, perhaps amending it along the way.
In response to (1) I find that May explicitly framed her actions in terms of "obeying the convention".
If no convention existed, why do this? https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab001
If no convention existed, why do this? https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab001
In response to (2), I find that May questioned the logic of the convention:
“it is Parliament’s responsibility to hold me to account for such decisions...But it is my responsibility as Prime Minister to make these decisions – and I will make them” https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab001
“it is Parliament’s responsibility to hold me to account for such decisions...But it is my responsibility as Prime Minister to make these decisions – and I will make them” https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab001
Yet at the same time, I also find that she pulled her punches.
She never said "Cameron was wrong" or rejected the convention directly.
A significant proportion of MPs continued to belief a convention existed. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab001
She never said "Cameron was wrong" or rejected the convention directly.
A significant proportion of MPs continued to belief a convention existed. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab001
In response to (3), I find that May added new caveats to those Cameron established.
In particular, she claimed the convention applied only to major military deployments like Iraq, and that she could legitimately bypass it in non-emergency situations. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab001
In particular, she claimed the convention applied only to major military deployments like Iraq, and that she could legitimately bypass it in non-emergency situations. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab001
Conventions, as Ivor Jennings (1959) tells us, consist of precedents, reasons and consensus.
Of the three, I argue, the presence or absence of consensus is key.
Of the three, I argue, the presence or absence of consensus is key.
In this, conventions form the lynchpin of what JAG Griffith called "the political constitution":
If an action is politically acceptable, it is also by definition constitutional.
(Not sure what @Prof_Phillipson would say about that...) https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab001
If an action is politically acceptable, it is also by definition constitutional.
(Not sure what @Prof_Phillipson would say about that...) https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab001
So, in sum, May was able to act in Syria without a prior parliamentary vote because she pushed back against the expectations that Cameron established, and a majority of MPs accepted what she had done.
In the process she weakened, but did not entirely destroy, the War Powers Convention established under Cameron.
Coming soon: A second post setting out some of the empirical data underpinning this argument, and looking at what MPs actually thought about Syria in 2013 and 2018.
@threadreaderapp please unroll