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Orpo and tanks. Follows on from a previous thread about the Ordnungspolizei. This thread is about Orpo-Panzertrupppen. https://twitter.com/bloodphilip/status/1347962445286010881
A difficult story. Why did the Orpo end up with a large panzer capability? From - uniform beat police of the Third Reich to a lightweight tank army.
This Orpo Order of Battle from 20 August 1940. The numbers called up on p.1 - largely middle aged men. On page 3 lists of weapons and equipment.
A reference identifying the early use of Orpo armour in the occupation zones. The Nazi occupation of Poland was heavily dependant on the Orpo 1939-40 because of overstretch. Some captured Polish armour was used by the Orpo but not recorded.
The 1941 regulations began to incorporate the greater commitments of European occupation. The concentration on occupation manpower ratios overrode all other considerations. Therefore difficult to recognise the conceptualisation of armour in Orpo operations.
Then 1942 - the surge in operational manpower - notice the vast increase on 1940. Third page lists the medals received:
Sorry for the plug. The book’s research focused on the mass of little threads about Bandenbekämpfung. In them was the appearance of armour in Orpo operations.
A COIN conference was hosted by the Orpo in 1941. During a later conference in 1942 Fegelein and Bittrich advised on the use of light armour in Bandenbekämpfung operations. From these conferences Bach-Zelewski began to build a new kind of force.
Why Bandit (Banden) and not partisan? It was essential to criminalise the partisans to motivate the troops to higher levels of violence. The cruelties flowed from this policy.
Enter Karl Pfeffer-Wildenbruch and Alfred Wünnenberg. Daleuge was relieved from duty because of Syphilis and was replaced by Wünnenberg. P-W was the boss of the Orpo Colonial Police branch. The promoted small detachments of armoured police to support police actions.
They essentially argued that Panzer or armoured forces, in German hands, guaranteed the trust of foreign auxiliaries - loyalty by gunpoint. Eventually the foreign units received their own armour in recognition of their loyalty.
Jumping to the operational level. This author put together a decent operational study. Predictably the book focuses on technical interpretation to avoid running up against war crimes and the Holocaust.
Controversial. Enter the Bandenbekämpfung specialists - Hannibal, von Gottberg, Dirlewanger and Reinefarth. They formulated an effective tactical methodology that briefly stalled the Soviet partisan incursions before Bagration.
Police Panzer methods. Close support shield, pressing the enemy to break and expose themselves to cordons manned with rifles and machine-guns. Crowd control methods used against partisans.
Warsaw 1944. The defence of Kovel added to Bach-Zelewski’s reputation, which is why he was given the Warsaw job. He unleashed his full power - arm-train, the SS-Police mixed capability air-squadron and ‘Karl’.
Warsaw. The variety of uniforms highlight the influence of the Orpo, supported by the Russian collaborators and a few SS units like Dirlewanger.
After Warsaw. Reinefarth and Dirlewanger were assigned strict security warfare jobs in Slovakia or in Küstrin. Their duties involved crushing resistance or preventing cities from surrendering.
Hannibal’s presence kept Königsberg in the fight until the the bitter end. Bach-Zelewski took Karl to the Battle of the Bulge. Meanwhile this enabled the Wehrmacht to fight the Bulge without having to worry about its rear areas.
In summary: the Orpo was Hitler’s inner army - waging security warfare, while the Wehrmacht conducted the conventional war. The Orpo panzer forces were used in a highly effective way against the partisans. But the panzers were only a small part of the Orpo order of battle.
Security warfare depended on cruelties and brutalities to act as a shock wave against resistance. In discussions with former Polish resistance fighters from Warsaw or Bilgoraj (July 1944), the common recollection was the shock element from the attack, then the cruelties/cordons.
The only way for partisans or guerrillas to survive was to run and escape the cordons. Tito was nearly captured, Kovpak ran for his life but those who were caught were nearly always killed. Its probable that only the BBC broadcast saved the lives of the Polish AK leaders.
This was an exceedingly difficult methodology for the allied investigators to comprehend even though they had experienced the tactics in the west (Vercors 1944). A court case against Bandenbekämpfung was not pursued because the Nazis became turncoats for immunity. End.
