Thread by @JJSchroden, I've seen some #Afghanistan commentators argue recently that the US-#Taliban Agreement is [...]

I've seen some #Afghanistan commentators argue recently that the US- #Taliban Agreement is a bad deal b/c it gave too many concessions to the TB while getting too few in return for the US. In this THREAD, I'll state why I think it's a bad deal from an assessment point of view. 1/n

To do that, let's walk through each of the things the US & #Taliban committed to in the agreement & answer the Q: "Is this objectively & publicly verifiable?"

Why is that Q important? B/c a good deal is one where both sides can reliably & transparently determine compliance. 2/n

Let's start w/the US:
1. Within 135 days...The US "will reduce the number of US forces in #Afghanistan to 8,600 & proportionally bring reduction in the number of its allies and Coalition forces."

A: This is O & P verifiable (& complete). 3/n

2. Within 135 days..."the United States, its allies, and the Coalition will withdraw all their forces from 5 military bases."

A: This is O & P verifiable (& complete). 4/n

3. "With the commitment & action on the obligations of the #Taliban...the United States, its allies, & the Coalition will complete withdrawal of all remaining forces from #Afghanistan within the remaining 9.5 months."

A: This is O & P verifiable (but incomplete). 5/n

4. "The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will withdraw all their forces from remaining bases."

A: This is O & P verifiable (but incomplete). 6/n

5. "The US [will] work with all relevant sides...to expeditiously release [up to 5,000] combat & political prisoners as a confidence building measure w/the coordination and approval of all relevant sides."

A: This is O & P verifiable (& complete). 7/n

6. "The US will initiate an admin review of current US sanctions & the rewards list against members of the #Taliban w/the goal of removing these sanctions by August 27, 2020."

A: This is O & P verifiable (but incomplete). 8/n

7. "w/the start of intra-Afghan negotiations, the US will start diplomatic engagement w/the UNSC & #Afghanistan to remove members of the #Taliban from the sanctions list w/the aim of achieving this objective by May 29, 2020."

A: This is O & P verifiable (but incomplete) 9/n

8. "The US & its allies will refrain from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of #Afghanistan or intervening in its domestic affairs."

A: The 1st part (use of force) is O & P verifiable; the 2nd part isn't (subjective). 10/n

9. "The US will request the recognition & endorsement of the United Nations Security Council for this agreement."

A: This is O & P verifiable (& complete). 11/n

10. "The US will seek econ coop for reconstruction w/the new post-settlement Afghan Islamic gov't as determined by the intra-Afghan...negotiations & will not intervene in its internal affairs."

A: The 1st part (aid) is O & P verifiable; the 2nd part isn't (subjective). 12/n

So, of the 10 express commitments the US makes in the US- #Taliban agreement, all 10 are either wholly or in part objectively and publicly verifiable. 13/n

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf

Now, let's do the #Taliban:
1. " #Taliban commits that its released prisoners will be committed to the responsibilities mentioned in this agreement so that they will not pose a threat to the security of the US & its allies"

A: This is not O & P verifiable (subjective). 14/n

2. " #Taliban will not allow any of its members, other individuals or groups, including #alQaida, to use the soil of #Afghanistan to threaten the security of the US & its allies."

A: This is not O & P verifiable (subjective in multiple ways). 15/n

3. " #Taliban will send a clear message that those who pose a threat to the security of the US & its allies have no place in #Afghanistan."

A: This is publicly verifiable but not objectively (what constitutes a "clear message"?) 16/n

4. #Taliban "will instruct [their] members...not to cooperate w/groups or individuals threatening the security of the US & its allies."

A: This is O & P verifiable (& I think complete?) 17/n

5. " #Taliban will prevent any group or individual in #Afghanistan from threatening the security of the US & its allies & will prevent them from recruiting, training & fundraising & will not host them"

A: This is not O & P verifiable (subjective in multiple ways). 18/n

6. " #Taliban is committed to deal w/those seeking asylum or residence in #Afghanistan according to int'l migration law & the commitments of this agreement, so that such persons do not pose a threat to the security of the US & its allies."

A: This is not O & P verifiable. 19/n

7. " #Taliban will not provide visas, passports, travel permits, or other legal documents to those who pose a threat to the security of the US & its allies to enter #Afghanistan."

A: This is not O & P verifiable. (It also treats the TB like they're already a govt!) 20/n

So, of the 7 express commitments made by the #Taliban, only 1 is objectively & publicly verifiable.

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf 21/n

To compare: the United States' commitments are almost entirely objectively & publicly verifiable, whereas the #Taliban's are almost entirely not.

Which means I can easily assess US compliance w/the terms of the agreement & it's almost impossible to assess TB compliance. 22/n

This is, from an assessment standpoint, literally the definition of a bad deal, as it puts *all* of the burden of proof on the US.

This is why, despite the consensus view that the Biden admin needs to formulate an #Afghanistan policy soon, it will be so difficult to do so. 23/n

The Biden admin effectively has three choices:
1. Withdraw by May 1. The #AfghanistanStudyGroup report concluded if it does so, #Afghanistan likely devolves into civil war. 24/n

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/afghanistan_study_group_final_report_a_pathway_for_peace_in_afghanistan.pdf

2. Unilaterally stay past May 1. This is effectively the recommendation of the @USIP #AfghanistanStudyGroup. But as I argued previously, doing so would likely result in the collapse of the #Afghanistan peace process. 25/n https://twitter.com/JJSchroden/status/1358780395395940353?s=20

https://twitter.com/JJSchroden/status/1358780395395940353?s=20

Unless the US can convincingly show that the #Taliban haven't upheld their commitments under the US-TB Agreement. I suspect this is part of what the Biden admin is looking to do via the review announced by @jakejsullivan. But as this thread shows, that will be VERY difficult 26/n

3. Negotiate an extension to the troop withdrawal timeline in the US- #Taliban agreement. This has been recommended publicly by at least @BRRubin & @LaurelMillerICG. But it would likely require the US to either convincingly argue TB non-compliance or make add'l concessions. 27/n

As this thread argues, convincingly arguing non-compliance will be very difficult. I don't know which way the Biden team is leaning on these issues, but I do know the US- #Taliban Agreement's structure does them no favors in assessing their options for #Afghanistan. 28/28

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