1. Interesting debate going on now in France over Barkhane. Predictably I find myself somewhere in the middle. https://www.publicsenat.fr/emission/allons-plus-loin/operation-barkhane-l-heure-du-bilan-au-senat-186583

2. On one side, folks say, "it's hopeless, we should leave." and "[insert generic cliché about the absence of a political objective and the need to have a proper political objective]". I don't agree with these things. And anyway, if it's a new agenda FR needs, what? Any ideas?

3. On the other, it's "we're at war against Islamist terrorism." And, "we don't talk enough about Barkhane's successes."

4. The War on Terror rhetoric is far too reductionist, especially in #Mali's case, where I think it's critical to distinguish between the fight against the legit jihadi bad guys and a shockingly diverse array of different actors pursuing a range of agendas. That's always been...

5. ...why CT in Mali has always been so hard: the entanglement between the pure jihadists and local actors, local politics, local drivers, etc. Let's use our new word: Imbrication.

6. That's why back before Serval neither FR nor the US wanted to strengthen Mali's military forces--not really: It's impossible to strengthen them to fight terrorists without also getting involved in all of Mali's other fights (esp with Arab and Tuareg armed factions).

7. Is Barkhane necessary? I'm inclined to think it is. But it's not sufficient. Never was and never will be. So the challenge is figuring out complement it with whatever it will take to make it work. Or, if that seems impossible, maybe it would be appropriate to leave, though...

8....with more clarity regarding what happens then.

9. There also needs to be frank talk about what's not working. I think EUTM is an example of something that's achieving far less than it should/could. Nearly 8 years on, there's now enough info available to fix it.