The debilitating socio-economic consequences of #Assad's blind investment in all-out war on his own population & infrastructure have been clear for a long while -- I'd posit that they're a more significant challenge to #Syria's regime than the peak of armed conflict in 2014-15. https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/1359503360597065730

#pt: That "challenge" is unlikely to amount to an uprising alike 2011, but it incessantly chips away at the regime's own power/support base, sowing anger, disenfranchisement, despair and, as has become more recently clear: more vocal expressions of discontent, criticism etc.

#pt: As @Elizrael & @Qussai_jukhadar make clear, #Assad's unrestrained brutality (e.g. Caesar images) has instilled a crippling fear among many -- but it doesn't require much to sustain an underlying, seething anger.

Given #Assad's penchant for violence, over-reaction is likely.

#pt: The financial crisis, catalyzed by collapse in #Lebanon, has killed #Syria's middle class. Though some in the #MiddleEast have explored avenues for investment in #Assad's #Syria, they've found it a deeply unattractive proposition.

There's no light at the end of the tunnel.

#pt: While it's analytically safe to assume we won't see a 2011-style uprising, how can today's intractable trajectory be sustainable for a bankrupt international pariah regime?

Personally, I don't think it is -- something has to give. But what this is remains to be seen.

Excellent @Elizrael thread on #Alawite disenchantment with #Assad -- a crucially important dynamic.

- "Alawis stood by #Assad who waged a war that led them to ruin."

- "With the military threat abating & standards of living rapidly deteriorating, Alawis want Assad gone..." https://twitter.com/Elizrael/status/1360190092581740544