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This is something oft overlooked in the popular myth of Waterloo.
The battle turned on Wellington's ironclad faith that the already-beaten Prussians would still come and help. And Blucher's ironclad faith that Wellington could hold the line against Napoleon. https://twitter.com/ZwhiteHistory/status/1358490170245459970
The battle turned on Wellington's ironclad faith that the already-beaten Prussians would still come and help. And Blucher's ironclad faith that Wellington could hold the line against Napoleon. https://twitter.com/ZwhiteHistory/status/1358490170245459970
Both men, at times, had members of their command staff screaming at them that they couldn't trust the other to do their bit, and to change strategy.
And it would have been easy under pressure for either to give in. It's not like they could phone each other for a reassuring chat.
And it would have been easy under pressure for either to give in. It's not like they could phone each other for a reassuring chat.
But Wellington and Blucher had agreed a plan, and they both knew that Napoleon could NOT be beaten by the British and Allies army, or the Prussian army alone.
Splitting and fighting them alone was Napoleon's ENTIRE strategy. From the beginning. Because he knew it too.
Splitting and fighting them alone was Napoleon's ENTIRE strategy. From the beginning. Because he knew it too.
And he came SO CLOSE to pulling it off.
But he didn't.
Because Wellington and Blucher held true to their words to each other, when it would have been easy for either General to justify not doing so to their men and their high commands.
But he didn't.
Because Wellington and Blucher held true to their words to each other, when it would have been easy for either General to justify not doing so to their men and their high commands.
I remember pouring over stories of Waterloo as a kid. Because Wellesley has always been one of my heroes.
And I remember the first time I saw reference to the fact that Blucher initially proposed calling it the Battle of La Belle Alliance, as that was a closer landmark. But Wellington pointed out the British tradition of going for the nearest decent sized habitation - Waterloo.
As a kid, I remember thinking:
"Thank God. The Battle of Waterloo sounds cool. The Battle of La Belle Alliance sounds weird. Like the French won or something."
"Thank God. The Battle of Waterloo sounds cool. The Battle of La Belle Alliance sounds weird. Like the French won or something."
But now, with the benefit of age, maturity and knowledge, part of me dearly wishes that they'd gone with La Belle Alliance.
It would have been far more reflective of the leadership, as well as the human bravery, that won out that day.
A promise is a promise. You don't back out.
It would have been far more reflective of the leadership, as well as the human bravery, that won out that day.
A promise is a promise. You don't back out.
Oh, and final sidenote:
If you've never read up on the ASTONISHING speed with which the Prussians managed to sort themselves out and race to reinforce Wellington after Napoleon smashed them at Ligny, then you really should.
The Prussian officer corps were frighteningly good.
If you've never read up on the ASTONISHING speed with which the Prussians managed to sort themselves out and race to reinforce Wellington after Napoleon smashed them at Ligny, then you really should.
The Prussian officer corps were frighteningly good.
Indeed although i'm not one for hinge points, the victory at Waterloo in part depended on the actions of Gneisenau, who suddenly found himself in command of the shattered Prussians at Ligny while Blucher was incapacitated.
Gneisenau had two options: retreat along his own supply lines to the east or fall back to the west towards Wellington.
East was the smart choice. But he knew Blucher's promise, so ordered a retreat west.
If he'd gone east the Prussians would never have reached Waterloo in time.
East was the smart choice. But he knew Blucher's promise, so ordered a retreat west.
If he'd gone east the Prussians would never have reached Waterloo in time.
