Beyond the ridiculousness and absurdity of it all, there's an important takeaway from the last week in Italian politics:

EU policy *can* affect party and public Euroscepticism in member states.

The Recovery Fund has changed completely the narrative around the EU in Italy. /1

Not only Italy had given a majority to (nominally) Eurosceptic parties in 2018, but they were on the brink of putting hardline Eurosceptics in key cabinet positions. Plus, the perceived lack of solidarity in the first phase of covid-19 response was highly salient last spring. /2

Just a reminder of where we were 10 months ago, when the 'frugals' were a thing: /3 https://twitter.com/leonardocarella/status/1249113948001128448?s=20

This is where we were 10 months ago: /4 https://www.ft.com/content/f21cf708-759e-11ea-ad98-044200cb277f

For what these numbers are worth, at the height of the EU showdown over the Recovery Fund in April 2020, 39.3% of Italians wanted to leave the Euro and the EU; 7.5% only the EU; 7.7% only the Euro. /5

In the October Eurobarometer survey (you know how I feel about Eurobarometer, but that's what we have), positive image of the EU improved by 11 points over June. /6

The EU does politics, not just policy. It's time the commission, and especially member states, realise it. The Recovery Fund - and arguably the SURE bonds - have been *political* successes first and foremost. Vaccine procurement has been a failure due to a *lack* of politics. /7