Frankly I don't even know where to start here, but this is one of the most unhitched takes I've read recently.

It seems like there is an intensive, but dilettantish effort by some Western Think Tanks to rehabilitate the fundamentalist AQ-offshoot HTS since 2021. (1/13) https://twitter.com/MEDirections/status/1356955420452085760

The introduction starts with equating HTS with the PYD, which is beyond ridiculous, as these are literally the most diametrically opposed groups of the war: HTS is sectarian, authoritarian and misogynist, PYD secular, council democratic and feminist. (2/13)

That the authors have no regard for democracy or the well-being of women gets pretty clear in the piece: Both are mentioned only three times.

Democracy two times has the words "opposition to" in front it, the third time it's in the foot notes.(3/13)

The mention of women is from an interview with a female " former JaN [Nusra] activist from a wealthy Damascene family" in Hatay. There she says - from Turkey - that women can talk a bit more about politics and the law to wear Niqab isn't enforced as strictly anymore. (4/13)

HTS' hegemonic aspirations in the opposition, which made it attack the AQ-affiliate Hurras ad-Din (which doesn't stand out at all looking at the bigger picture of acting against other militant formations in Idlib) are presented as acting against global Jihadi networks. (5/13)

This is ridiculous, because just because it has given up open jihadist ambitions beyond Syria, it doesn't mean that they don't accept staying a safe haven for Jihadi networks. In fact, groups like TIP or Ajnad al-Qawqaz are still operating as close allies with HTS. (6/13)

The authors decided to play this down as "the remaining foreign fighters, including the
TIP Uighurs and the Chechens, accept the new HTS line." Which is a very weak argument, since talking with them wouldn't exactly reveal ideological moderation. (7/13)

The boldest claims can be found in the conclusions:

"HTS appears to be the only actor capable of developing and implementing a coherent counter-insurgency
strategy against global jihad, including AQ remnants and IS networks." (8/13)

“The only way to handle global jihadis is to rely on local ones."

"It defeated IS in its territories despite strong attempts to rebuild IS networks after the capture of Baghouz by the SDF."

What a ridiculous argument is this? (9/13)

HTS is an deep-rooted authoritarian actor. Of course IS fails to set up networks in their area, especially when it's after years of brutal war and destruction.

If you're looking for actually counter-islamist strategies, look to the SDF. (10/13)

Of course, there is a considerable insurgency in Dayr az-Zawr and southern Hasakah/Hesekê, but that's exactly because IS built extensive networks in these areas over years.

You're advocating to let HTS do the same thing in Idlib, indoctrinating society. (11/13)

The authoritarian dynamic of creating ties and eventually a patronage network with the elite of controlled areas - which is exactly how Assad's regime functions, is presented as diluting of extremism and technocracy.
But again, it fails to say how it's doing this exactly. (12/13)

Islamism doesn't have a comprehensive economic agenda, so outsourcing these issues isn't a problem.

Interesting though: Western NGOs, especially @giz_gmbh actually funded HTS governance by largely taking over its health ministry. (13/13)

Addition:
As there was a lot of disagreeable text to go through, I forgot to add this thread I made in 2017 about the fate of Idlib's Druze community and their life under HTS: https://mobile.twitter.com/Gargaristan/status/901502840224481280