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I am absolutely convinced that notions of nostalgia play a not insignificant role in the viewing of the Indo-Pacific from the UK (see 'East of Suez', 'Far East', etc).
Simultaneously, I don't think that is, in of itself, a issue. Nor do I think it undercuts strategic calculus.1/
Simultaneously, I don't think that is, in of itself, a issue. Nor do I think it undercuts strategic calculus.1/
As @GaskarthJamie, @dmmccourt and @w_d_james have all referenced to in their works, the psychological aspects of British Grand Strategy are heavily present, and often underpin several unconscious assumptions which themselves inform how crises and decisions are made. 2/
This can take the form of Gaskarth's and McCourt's 'Role-Playing' (which I am a big fan of). Role-Playing is not inherently bad, it is rather just an easy way to systematize how a state, at a more meta level, sees itself in the world. (image from Gaskarth, 2014) 3/
None of this is unique to the UK, at least in terms of psychological frameworks influencing Grand Strategies. Though of course, each nation or non-state actor will have unique data points which inform their respective views. 4/
Which brings us to the Indo-Pacific (IP). The region as both a notion and a reality has come to act as a nexus for competing criticisms and visions of the UK. Be it a form of 'Global Britain' or 'unrealistic nostalgic Britain'. Both takes are of course too simplistic. 5/
The IP tilt (and it is a tilt, not a pivot), will be informed by both psychological needs and wider strategic calculations. The psychological elements are obvious, though often derogatorily referred to as 'imperial nostalgia'. 6/
Strategically, far better individuals are better placed on here to discuss the granular elements of the pros and cons of an IP tilt. Naturally @alessionaval is one, with a rather excellent mini thread here 7/ https://twitter.com/alessionaval/status/1358516882719068161?s=20
Ultimately, a lot of this will have to wait for the IR. Though one shouldn't be too careful to view the IR as the be-all-to-end-all. Even during the Cold War more granular discussions of cost-benefit and arguments within Whitehall took place behind closed doors. 8/
And I think that's the largest takeaway from this. Often the IP is discussed as the Johnson government's decision. Whilst likely some impetus has been added, one should not forget inroads were being made in the past. In vague details pre-2016, more so post. 9/
This isn't simply a flight of fancy. The Whitehall machinery is engaged, admittedly to various degrees. But engaged it is. From MoD and FCDO to DFIT and Cabinet Office. The direction of travel may have been pointed forward politically, but all strategy is political. 10/
Which neatly circles us back to the psychological element. If all strategy is political, and politics is very much informed by emotive as much as material concerns, it is only natural that strategies will have psychological influences. 11/
Strategy could never, will never, be a simple calculus of 'Ends', 'Ways' and 'Means'. Arguably, the most effective ones, whilst factoring them in, will never raise such a calculus to primary position. Rather, it a synergy of the nation's culture, history and said dynamic. 12/
As Dr James referred to when it came to Grand Strategies, drawing upon Collin Dueck, if we judge a strategy by impossible standards, then it is doomed to failed. So rather than a call to arms to wholeheartedly support the IP tilt, this is more a little plea to judge it in less13/
stark terms. Give emotion a chance. End/
[PS: However I will fight to the death to have the term 'Far East' burned from existence in the modern lexicon. And I'm starting to feel the same about 'East of Suez']
