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A major fallout of the modernist mind-body dualist frame is that we increasingly see ourselves, not as subjects of experience, but as objects in the world. We are, as Gilbert Ryle puts it, a ghost in a machine.
Consider how this modernist frame plays out in the real world in the "as long as you're not hurting anyone" mindframe. People are free to do drugs, be sexual libertines, be into transhumanism, cut off limbs. All of this is acceptable.
What is unacceptable is for the mind to be tarnished. No racism, no sexism, etc. Not a single trace is allowed and standards of purity are kept ultra high.
Even when you are not demonstrating any of these things in public, there are still tests that show "implicit" impurity.
Even when you are not demonstrating any of these things in public, there are still tests that show "implicit" impurity.
The body can be transmuted, deformed, destroyed, and treated as a playground to be ridden into the ground. But all the while the mind must be kept to impossible standards of purity.
The body becomes increasingly an object in of itself - separated from and made secondary to the mind as everything becomes a "life hack."
The body stops being sacred and becomes more of a tool to attain the mind's desires.
In contrast, the modern "intellectual" falls more in love with his own mind, his own rationality. He shows derision for those who embody physicality as well as those who aren't as "intellectual" as he.
He believes himself to be superior to others because he "knows things." But he only knows things because he has read things, not because he has actually taken part of them physically.
As their pursuits get more intricate and complex, the less they can ever participate in it.
As their pursuits get more intricate and complex, the less they can ever participate in it.
There's knowing about riding a bike by reading a book about riding them as well as never epistemically knowing how to ride a bike while actually riding a bike. The two types of "knowledge" aren't comparable.
It's as if the former will brag about how much he knows about bicycles, their history, and the mechanics that go into creating one, but will think less of the person who only knows how to ride the bicycle.
The ghost can only appreciate other ghosts, it seems.
The ghost can only appreciate other ghosts, it seems.
The ghost simply doesn't know how to interface with to his machine in ways that aren't giving the ghost its endorphins. He certainly has no idea on how to reconnect the two distincts back into a cohesive whole other than possibly to think about the problem some more.
The ghost wishes he could transcend the limits of his machine. He wishes he didn't have to eat solid food, never had to sleep, and never wants to do any physical labor. He will think about this quite a bit through his whole existence.
The biggest irony is perhaps that most of these "rationalists" do not believe in non-physical things. While they lean so heavily on their "mind," they deny the existence of the mind as anything else except an part of the corporeal body they wish to transcend.
It's as if the mind is what is most real, and the corporeal body is in some storehouse, ready for application and use. Heidegger calls this a "standing reserve"... to be ordered and conscripted, assembled and disassembled, set up and set aside.
"All distances in time and space are shrinking, yet the hasty setting aside fo all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in a small amount of distance... it's even warded off by the resetless removal of distances."
As we technologize the world, man himself becomes technologized because he cannot see the world, including himself, in any other way.
What happens when we increasingly come to know ourselves in the way that we know about bicycles by merely reading *about* them? It's impossible to know oneself purely in that way, but the trend is in the direction of maximizing this type of knowing. https://twitter.com/hyonschu/status/1358693340972085250
The most accessible way to read Heidegger is to think of "Being" as a verb, an action; and beings as nouns, things existing in the world.
We come to think of our mind as both verb and noun, but the mind is always doing. To think of mind strictly as a noun is a mistake.
We come to think of our mind as both verb and noun, but the mind is always doing. To think of mind strictly as a noun is a mistake.
But to think of body as wholly a noun is a bigger mistake.
While the arguments I make are certainly not widely-accepted philosophical theses, we must give some credence to the notion that we treat the mind and body as being separate in our actions.
The entirety of the field of artificial intelligence currently presupposes that we can give objects intelligence, agency, or some other supernatural "glue" if we give it a sufficient replica of the mind and shove it in a body.
Materialists appear to think that we live in a world of objects devoid of personhood, souls, spirits, or any of that supernatural stuff. But at the same time, many appear to claim that we can give personhood to computers.
More ridiculously, they think this an existential threat.
More ridiculously, they think this an existential threat.
Which will it be? Do non-living organisms have agency or intelligence or do they not? Or is the claim that we humans can give agency to non-living things given enough transistors and instructions?
Isn't that just faith in an assertion aided by hubris?
Isn't that just faith in an assertion aided by hubris?
Or in other words, we simply *imagine* the possibility and through our imaginations assert that giving life to objects is not only possible, but a mere stone's throw away.
But when these same people think of civilizations who believed mountains have a soul, they scoff.
But when these same people think of civilizations who believed mountains have a soul, they scoff.
When people say AlphaGo is "an amazing Go player" what they really do is give it life, give it agency, give it a "spirit" through our imaginations. We afford it attributes it does not have by filling in the gaps.
No different than the ancients who thought the rivers were alive.
No different than the ancients who thought the rivers were alive.
Either there is a ghost in AlphaGo *and* in the mountains, or there is no ghost in either. We simply cannot have it both ways in stating that one is a mere fact of science and the other is a delusion.
This argument can be laid out as one of consciousness. Many argue that consciousness is not necessary for intelligence. I will argue that a subject of experience is. Whether that counts as consciousness or not is an trite argument.
A subject of experience need not fulfill tasks to *be* a subject of experience, even though a subject of experience does often fulfill tasks towards its own aims.
Dare I say, the subject of experience supervenes on consciousness?
(I still don't get supervenience. Its stupid.)
Dare I say, the subject of experience supervenes on consciousness?
(I still don't get supervenience. Its stupid.)
