I think that "offense" is the right way to describe proactive counterintelligence tactics, which are often the best way to defend in intel/cyber. The problem usually isn't offense per se but planning, tradecraft, deconfliction, etc. That said... 1/ https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1358149569784209408

There is an economic asymmetry between the USA, who makes the stuff, and Ru/Ch who just uses it. It's not a good look to been seen as both making and breaking the stuff.
So maybe just don't be seen. Planning, tradecraft,... 2/

The US seems to care marginally about hypocrisy costs (right @m_poznansky ?) so this not-good-look matters marginally. Ru/Ch care less, for different reasons, and may even get some utility out of using their ops to highlight US hypocrisy. 3/

I'm not sure, however, that Ru/Ch have not paid a price for noisy, messy, brazen ops (planning, tradecraft,...). NATO folks always mention Ru cyber as a reason for military balancing. China hawks always mention cyber as evidence for Ch malevolence & a reason for balancing. 4/

I don't think the lesson we want to take away is that the US should be more like Ru/Ch. There's a subset of Ru/Ch offense that the US should definitely NOT do. And there's another subset that the US should just DO BETTER. I think @DAlperovitch and I agree on that?