1) From colleague Mike Emanuel. Fmr Acting USCP Chief Sund to Pelosi/Congressional ldrs about 1/6: There has been much conflicting information presented by various officials and the media regarding the preparations...I would like to set the record straight from my perspective.

2) Sund: Nothing in our collective experience or our intelligence – including intelligence provided by FBI, Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and D.C. Metropolitan Police – indicated that a well-coordinated, armed assault on the Capitol might occur on Jan 6

3) Sund: Having previously handled two major post-election demonstrations successfully utilizing an action plan that was based on intelligence assessments that had proven to be credible, reliable..we reasonably assumed the intelligence assessment for Jan6..was also correct

4) Sund: I approached the two Sergeants at Arms to request the assistance of the National Guard, as I had no authority to do so without an Emergency Declaration by the Capitol Police Board (CPB).

5) Sund: Irving stated that he was concerned about the “optics” and didn’t feel that the intelligence supported it. He referred me to the Senate Sergeant at Arms (who is currently the Chair of the CPB) to get his thoughts on the request.

6) Sund: I then spoke to Mr. Stenger and again requested the National Guard. Instead of approving the use of the National Guard, however, Mr. Stenger suggested I ask them how quickly we could get support if needed and to “lean forward” in case we had to request assistance

7) Sund: During the meeting, no entity, including the FBI, provided any intelligence indicating that there would be a coordinated violent attack on the United States Capitol by thousands of well-equipped armed insurrectionists. I

8) Sund: At no time did the Department of Homeland Security issue a threat advisory bulletin in reference to violent extremists planning a coordinated, violent attack on the U.S. Capitol.

9) Sund: It should also be noted that the U.S. Secret Service planned to and did escort the Vice President of the United States to the Capitol on January 6, which it obviously would not have done if it believed there to be a threat of a violent insurrection at the Capitol

10) Sund: When the group arrived at the perimeter, they did not act like any group of protestors I had ever seen. Unlike other heated protests, these protesters did not simply congregate to angrily voice their grievances.

11) Sund: As soon as this group arrived at our perimeter, they immediately began to fight violently with the officers and to tear apart the steel crowd control barriers, using them to assault the officers.

12) Sund: It was immediately clear that their primary goal was to defeat our perimeter as quickly as possible and to get past the police line. his mob was like nothing I have seen in my law enforcement career.

13) Sund: The group consisted of thousands of well-coordinated, well-equipped violent criminals. They had weapons, chemical munitions, protective equipment, explosives, and climbing gear. A number of them were wearing radio ear pieces indicating a high level of coordination.

14) Sund: It was clear to me at 1:00 p.m. that the situation was deteriorating rapidly. I called MPD and requested assistance and they responded immediately. I also requested assistance from the U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division and other law enforcement agencies.

15) Sund: I notified the two Sergeant at Arms by 1:09 p.m. that I urgently needed support and asked them to declare a State of Emergency and authorize the National Guard. I was advised by Mr. Irving that he needed to run it up the chain of command.

16) Sund: I continued to follow up with Mr. Irving, who was with Mr. Stenger at the time, and he advised that he was waiting to hear back from congressional leadership, but expected authorization at any moment.

17) Sund: As a result of these explosive devices, extensive USCP resources were dispatched to the scenes, and two congressional office buildings had to be evacuated. I believe all of this was part of a coordinated plan related to the attack on the Capitol

18) Sund: I could see that the USCP and MPD officers were fighting with all they had to protect the Capitol building. I saw officers hit with pipes, wooden sticks, flag poles, and sprayed with mace and bear spray, all while trying to defend themselves against projectiles

19) Sund: The mob was violently and ruthlessly attacking law enforcement officers in an effort to breach their lines. The officers fought courageously against the violent attackers for over an hour before any individuals in the mob were able to breach the Capitol Building.

20) Sund: At some entrances to the Capitol, law enforcement fought with the mob for hours to prevent them from accessing the building.

21) Sund: Lt. General Walter Piatt stated, "I don't like the visual of the National Guard standing a line with the Capitol in the background. I would much rather prefer to relieve USCP officers from other posts so they can handle the protestors."

22) Sund: I urgently advised that this was not an option and that I did not have officers to swap with National Guard and that I needed assistance immediately. Lt. General Piatt..that his recommendation would be not to support the request.

23) Sund: Almost two hours later, by 4:00 p.m., we had still not received authorization from the Pentagon to activate the National Guard. Mr. Stenger offered to have Senator McConnell call the Secretary of the Army to expedite the request.

24) Sund: The first 150 members of the National Guard were not sworn in on Capitol grounds until 5:40 p.m., four and a half hours after I first requested them and three and a half hours after my request was approved by the Capitol Police Board.

25) Sund: I still cannot fathom why in the midst of an armed insurrection, which was broadcast worldwide on television, it took the Department of Defense over three hours to approve an urgent request for National Guard support.

26) Sund: What occurred on January 6th cannot be considered under any circumstances a protest, a rally, or civil disobedience. This was a well-planned, coordinated, armed insurrection at the United States Capitol.

27) Sund: he USCP does not have the manpower, the training, or the capabilities to handle an armed insurrection involving thousands of individuals bent on violence and destruction at all costs.

28) Sund: Nevertheless, because of their bravery and professionalism in the face of this attack, USCP officers prevented the mob’s actions from resulting in more bloodshed, and carried out their mission to protect the Members of Congress and the legislative process.

29) Sund: Officials or officers who violated policies or directives, or even their oath, need to be held accountable. I also wish we had had better intelligence and warnings as to the possibility of this type of military style armed insurrection.

30) Sund: The entire intelligence community seems to have missed this. In addition, this incident has demonstrated that going forward, the USCP needs more unilateral authority to implement its security planning and the ability to call in National Guard support when needed.

31) Sund: Steps need to be taken to ensure National Guard’s ability to support the USCP is seamless in the future.

32) Sund: Given this new concerning shift in the threats facing the United States Capitol and its Members, Congress needs to seriously consider the physical security of the Campus, and other security protocols.

33) Sund: Every aspect of planning for such an event in the nation’s capital, and likely elsewhere, must be reconsidered anew.

34) Sund: I must add that I wish that before placing the blame on the USCP and on me as the Chief for the breach of the Capitol by an insurrectionist mob, more consideration would have been given to the impact of incomplete information provided by intelligence assessments...

35) Sund: ...the denied National Guard request, and the subsequent delayed approval for National Guard assistance.