I am...um...slowly coming around to critiques of (much) scholarly writing in the humanities.
The problem isn't that people can't understand it—as I've pointed out, physics is hard for laypeople—it's that this stuff seems unfalsifiable by *experts*.
The problem isn't that people can't understand it—as I've pointed out, physics is hard for laypeople—it's that this stuff seems unfalsifiable by *experts*.
I'm not saying humanities should be subject to Popperian standards. But we need shared standards for identifying arguments as better or worse, logical or illogical, based on evidence that is real or not, etc.
Otherwise it's poetry. Which, great! But that's a different genre.
Otherwise it's poetry. Which, great! But that's a different genre.
I say this as a BIG fan of "theory" and wonky philosophy and highly specialized studies. Again, the problem isn't inscrutability. It's that I'm beginning to suspect there's often nothing there to scrute. An emperor's new clothes kind of situation.
It's analogous to something I criticized in economic theory, which Paul Romer called "mathiness"—the use of inscrutable language (in this case math) to hide the absence of an actual connection to reality. https://aeon.co/essays/how-economists-rode-maths-to-become-our-era-s-astrologers
It's also analogous—maybe even more so?—to the empty corporate jargon that great humanists skewer so effectively.
At any rate, no good answers here, but I'm paying closer attention to the problem.
At any rate, no good answers here, but I'm paying closer attention to the problem.