Had an interesting discussion with @samagreene and @TarikCyrilAmar as to whether Russia's foreign policy can be described as successful or otherwise. Some reflections.

To understand whether Russia's foreign policy is successful, we have to ask what its purpose is.

If its stated purpose is to stick a finger up to the West and demonstrate how Russia is strong and independent "whatever you do", then it can be described as moderately successful. However, this is an assumption too far.

In reality, the long-term goal of Russian foreign policy in Europe (and here I include Soviet foreign policy from the early Cold War) has been to:

1) Weaken transatlantic ties and NATO structures in particular;
2) Exercise preponderant power in Europe.

How do we know that this is Russia's long-term goal? Why, from the study of archival evidence: there is a consistent policy to this effect from Stalin to Gorbachev and beyond.

The way it has gone about trying to accomplish these goals is by 1) playing on US-European contradictions and 2) exploiting contradictions between France and Germany. However, the results have been rather dispiriting. Russia has abjectly failed in both 1) and 2).

The reasons for this failure lie primarily in its strategic impatience, i.e. giving in to the temptation to stick up a finger to the West (mainly for reasons that have to do with domestic legitimacy narratives - see my thread on legitimacy yesterday).

That's why I argue that whereas Russia has consistently succeeded in presenting itself as the bogeyman of Europe, this success cannot be construed as actual foreign policy success insofar as this has not been the purpose of its foreign policy.

This is important to keep in mind when we discuss the failure of @JosepBorrellF's Moscow gambit. His loss has not necessarily been Russia's gain - quite the opposite is true.