Read on Twitter
1. [THREAD] Yemen, Middle East Watchers, NatSec Pros: A few thoughts regarding Biden’s major news regarding the Yemen war in the past few days.
2. Biden visited the State Department - yesterday’s speech was a nod to the career staff and signals that Biden intends to rely heavily on professional expertise. Biden also mentioned USAID (as did Blinken earlier) which affirms the value and mission of the Agency.
3. Biden picks Tim Lenderking as the Yemen envoy. This appointment is both interesting and predictable. Biden gave accolades to Lenderking and elevated his prominence and importance to lead US diplomacy on Yemen.
4. Lenderking’s appointment is also predictable in that he has essentially been serving in that position for years as the deputy assistant secretary for NEA at State. He knows the account and the actors; he has deep experience and is a solid pick.
5. Lenderking and Barbara Leaf, previous Amb to UAE and now slotted in the Biden NSC, provide deep substance on Yemen both at State and NSC. When Samatha Power steps into USAID, that agency will be supercharged.
6. As Reagan once said, personnel is policy. But there is more. Here are a few additional considerations:
7. Biden halts offensive weapons sales to Saudi. This announcement represents the biggest policy shift. There is ambiguity, potentially, between offensive/defensive sales; but the intent is clear. American weapons will no longer assist the Saudis w/ military action in Yemen.
8. The pause of the FTO designation of the Houthis ends Feb 26. The administration will have to provide clarity on this contentious issue.
9. My guess: the administration splits the baby by targeting senior and mid level Houthi political and military leadership for sanctions and FTO designation while not including the entire movement.
10. Under my read of the Pompeo FTO designation, the janitor in the ministry of education in Sanaa would be swept up in the designation. The Biden team would likely demonstrate more nuance and sophistication in the designation. This is only speculation - but it makes sense.
11. More on the FTO designation. There is a tremendous divide between Yemeni diaspora and citizens who favor the FTO designation and western NGOs that oppose. Biden policy has to acknowledge this gap and weave a satisfactory outcome.
12. Finally on the FTO designation, Pompeo and the Saudis grossly miscalculated the political environment. They wanted to box in Biden with the FTO designation, instead they propelled Yemen to the forefront of American foreign policy.
13. Overwhelmingly the American people don’t want to be involved in Yemen, they don’t want to support the war, they don’t want to sell weapons to the combatants, and they don’t want to be involved. Bottom line: Biden delivered on his campaign promises on Yemen.
14. But, but, but, this Biden policy shift has massive blind spots.
15. Will the Houthis expand power/control, including into Marib? The Houthis have won the war in the north and consolidated power over 70-80% of the people, institutions, trade, and economy. Do these changes give the Houthis more running room? Probably. What does Biden do then?
16. The Houthis are bad actors. The Houthis are the ONLY party that can change the humanitarian situation in the north today. They can open access to humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable; they can allow for an increase in flow of private sector basic commodities.
17. They have taken no responsibility for the massive humanitarian crises; with Biden’s policy changes, they own the humanitarian crisis entirely. How will the aid community respond?
18. What happens during the next Saudi-Houthi skirmish? The Iranians will continue to entice the Houthis to poke the Saudi southern flank? What happens then? Do the Saudi strike back into Houthi launch sites? Probably - and then what?
19. The economy is in shambles. The split in the Central Bank between Aden and Sanaa is a driving force in the decline of household purchasing power and the collapse of the economy. In most civil wars, the central bank holds -
20. Yemen is a near historical anomaly when trying to repair the Central Bank. State/USAID do not readily have the technical expertise to help Hadi re-construct the bank. This takes world class expertise, most of whom don’t want to spend time in Aden. What happens next?
21. The Hadi government demonstrates no accountability. The Central Bank has not been audited, its books, hard currency holdings, expenses, and authorities are not transparent. The Ministry of Finance has no budget, within limited reporting on revenue or expenditures.
22. The $2 billion from the Saudis to facilitate private trade has not been audited. The UN reports massive corruption and favored deals to Yemen oligarchs. The economy cannot recover when the Central Bank and the Hadi gov't facilitates corruption and war profiteers.
23. Is there any will by Hadi or the Saudis to reduce corruption?
24. The FSO Safer tanker remains an environmental time bomb. The Houthis control the wrecked tanker; its leaking, an environmental disaster looms, the UN has no access.
25. The FSO is likely the most immediate risk to millions of people - all diplomatic effort must focus on mitigating this potential catastrophe in the near term. Who is leading point on the FSO Safer and what are the results in de-risking this threat?
26. Summary: Yemen’s overlapping civil war, Houthi dominating control in the north, the regionalization of the conflict, a broken economy, and Hadi government’s corruption and misgovernance are exceedingly complex issues.
27. The Biden administration, with support of Congress, wants the US out of the war effort in Yemen. There is no domestic support for military engagement in Yemen or support to the Saudi led coalition’s armed campaign. Biden delivered.
28. The prospects for Yemen though remain bleak. The likely outcome is that the people of Yemen will continue to suffer in the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis - with no immediate end in sight. [End]
