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Interesting discussion here between @asfandyarmir and @JJSchroden on public attitudes about Afghanistan, how it might (or might not) constrain decision-making, and how we would know. A few thoughts: https://twitter.com/asfandyarmir/status/1357498109501214720
First, issue salience is an important factor here. All other things being equal, if the public doesn't care about an issue, the administration is likely to have more room for manoeuvre. As @JJSchroden notes, some polls may obscure how much people care. https://twitter.com/JJSchroden/status/1357318754351407104?s=20
In fact, @jimgolby and Peter Feaver found remarkable ambivalence about Afghanistan in a more recent survey, with 41% having no opinion on whether the US had accomplished its goals there. https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-myth-of-war-weary-americans-11606863481
That doesn't mean public attitudes are unimportant. Since public attitudes are in part shaped by elite cues, there is a feedback loop here. Officials will be mindful that foreign policy elites who disagree with their policy can shape the narrative if/when the public takes notice.
That may well mean that the primary constituency (and source of constraint) on the issue is actually those nat-sec professionals, political elites & interest groups who actually are paying attention. On this issue, see excellent work by @ProfSaunders e.g. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2015.1070618
More generally, then, what the public thinks (or whether they care) *now* may not be as important to leaders as what the public might think *after* a decision has been made, its effects have become clear and prominent elites are framing those "facts on the ground" for the public.
Of course, polls of current attitudes can inform expectations of future public opinion. Those asking specific questions about future courses can be particularly instructive. E.g. https://twitter.com/asfandyarmir/status/1357161311369453569?s=20
But leaders rely on a variety of other indicators to gauge public opinion, including their own political instincts, and they are often wrong. On the latter, see this excellent article by @jkertzer, @busbyj2 @ProfJordanTama Dina Smeltz and Jonathan Monten: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-11-03/americans-want-engage-world
In short, polls are a useful but inherently imperfect means of assessing leaders' *perceptions* of *anticipated* public opinion, which is what really matters when thinking about how public/electoral pressures constrain decision-making.
So I agree that we need to pay attention to other sources of information, and tracking elite analyses is one great way to do this: https://twitter.com/asfandyarmir/status/1337503850886938625
But history and context also matter. So, third, let's look at the Iraq precedent. Here I'll draw on my @Journal_IS piece which examined the Obama admin's decision to withdraw all troops in 2011. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00371
Important context here: Biden was the administration's lead on Iraq at this time, Tony Blinken was directly engaged in the debates as his National Security Advisor, and Lloyd Austin was the commanding general in Baghdad...
While it's true as @JJSchroden noted that Iraq has tended to attract more attention than Afghanistan, that wasn't always the case. Around the time the Obama admin was debating whether to keep troops on, both Iraq and Afghanistan were out of the headlines.
Having been ranked as the 2nd most important problem facing the US in 2008, by mid-2010 Iraq was tracking in a lowly 14th place, on a par with Afghanistan (at 3% of mentions): https://news.gallup.com/poll/141275/economydominates-nation-important-problem.aspx
In my paper, I argue that the Obama-Biden team saw the continued presence of US troops as a kind of insurance policy against a deterioration of security in Iraq for which they might be blamed in the 2012 campaign. Iraq carried low salience, and they wanted to keep it that way.
Obama decided to withdraw in late 2011 when the political cost of maintaining that insurance policy (having campaigned on a pledge to end the war) began to outweigh the perceived risks of the situation on the ground unravelling after US troops left.
That calculation may have been politically wise in the context of the 2012 election, but the legacy of what happened thereafter (with troops returning to fight IS in 2014), including very vocal criticism from GOP voices and many nat-sec elites, will not be lost on Biden.
Today, I think it's reasonable to speculate that Biden might again see a residual troop presence in Afghanistan in terms of an insurance policy, balancing strategic and political risks, albeit with a different coverage and premium.
Notable here is Biden's view that, despite the importance of "ending" the "forever wars", "using a few hundred Special Forces soldiers and intelligence assets" in "smaller-scale missions" is "sustainable militarily, economically, and politically". https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again
This frames the utility of a residual force in terms of a risk management tool. This idea - keeping minor problems from turning into major crises, as @jimgolby has elsewhere put it - has plenty of support among would-be critics of "precipitate" withdrawal. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/trump-leaving-biden-mess-afghanistan/617229/
As such, passing no judgement on the strategic logic here, I will just note it has reasonable political logic. As with Iraq in 2010/11, Afghanistan carries low salience, and continuing a small residual troop presence to forestall a spike in violence will likely keep it that way.
Finally, against this, there are electoral realities to consider. Biden is in the (relatively) permissive honeymoon phase of his term, and may not intend to run for re-election. Those conditions will reduce his sensitivity to the constraints of public opinion, such as it is. END.
