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A quick thread on the Macron remarks on teaming up with the US on China - and his remarks on China more generally at the @AtlanticCouncil yesterday 1/12 https://twitter.com/AtlanticCouncil/status/1357408475899387911
On the one hand the language does reinforce the sense that there was some kind of weird Merkel-Macron baton passing moment on European China policy in December - little of it sounded like the foundations of a real post-Merkel EU approach to China 2/ https://twitter.com/thorstenbenner/status/1357428336230871045
The references to climate being purely an area of “partnership” with China, for instance, just feel outdated, lagging well behind where the more sophisticated European thinking on this question is now moving (here is the essential paper on the topic: https://ecfr.eu/publication/climate-superpowers-how-the-eu-and-china-can-compete-and-cooperate-for-a-green-future/) 3/
But Macron’s statement about it being ”counterproductive” to “join all together against China” certainly reflects a wider consensus - Europe was never going to join a monolithic “counter-China coalition”. It’s not being asked to do that though 4/
If you read any of the serious analysis by the new Biden team on China strategy, it’s not about a rigid bloc - it’s about “coalitions” on specific issues. And in the areas where Europe weighs most seriously for US strategy, those coalitions are still very much on the table
Here is the EU’s top trade official straightforwardly talking about “working for an alliance of democracies to address the systemic challenges China raises”. This is what Macron pitched Trump in the past too - the strategic economic issues, not a comprehensive balancing coalition
Lots of the critical coalition work is not about ”counter-China” activities anyway - the agenda on tech, industrial policy, standard-setting, export controls, supply chains, connectivity doesn’t depend on European leaders simultaneously making performative statements about China
Here from December is the European Commission’s proposal for a transatlantic agenda. As with so many of these documents, the fact that you don’t have “because China” littered through the text doesn’t mean that China isn’t conditioning swathes of it: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2279 8/
This isn't to deny that the signaling matters (that's the most problematic thing about the CAI: https://ecfr.eu/article/europes-china-deal-how-not-to-work-with-the-biden-administration/). But European leaders are rarely going to make satisfyingly confrontational statements about China (they are not alone among US partners and allies in this...)
There are unhelpful hang-ups about how European leaders/officials are approaching the US on China now- too defensive about what the Biden administration will propose, too much talk about being autonomous rather than being autonomous and using the moment to advance Europe’s goals
There is a risk that there will be a serious undershooting of what’s required on the China-conditioned EU-US agenda if these hang-ups persist. But European statements of fealty to a counter-China coalition will not accompany even the most ambitious version of this agenda 11/
Again, my sense is that the new Biden team is perfectly well aware of all this and will focus on the substance of where cooperation with the Europeans matters most on the China competition agenda rather than the theatrics of public confrontation 12/12