Why did Myanmar coup surprise many foreign analysts & diplomats, even though the generals telegraphed their intentions? Partly it's because predictions are hard, esp about the future. But there's another important factor behind what spies might call an intelligence failure 1/

When intelligence agencies fail to foresee a major event/issue, like a coup or revolution (or Saddam's absence of WMD), there's a tendency to view it as a problem of intelligence collection. If only they had better or more accurate information, they could have seen it coming 2/

But CIA analyst Dick Heuer argued intel failures were "usually caused by failures of analysis, not failures of collection". I.e. "Relevant information is discounted, misinterpreted, ignored, rejected, or overlooked because it fails to fit a prevailing mental model or mind-set" 3/

In his brilliant history of global espionage, Christopher Andrew says that the mistaken view that Saddam had WMD was a classic example of flawed analysis, more than collection. Western officials presumed that if Saddam did not have WMD he would have admitted as much... 4/

... or allowed UN inspectors back into Iraq so as to avoid a US-led invasion. But, as Saddam later revealed under interrogation, he didn’t do as they presumed because he was more scared about revealing Iraq’s vulnerabilities to Iran than he was about Western threats. 5/

Heuer called this “mirror-imaging”, mistakenly assuming that an adversary thinks like you & you can simply ask 'what would would I do if I was in his shoes': “The US perspective on what is in another country’s national interest is usually irrelevant in intelligence analysis." 5/

So what does this have to do with Myanmar? Many analysts can't understand why the military would take direct control when they already had so much power in the old system & could let Aung San Suu Kyi struggle with the nitty gritty of day-to-day government. 6/

But the Tatmadaw had warned of its intentions, as well as its rationale. Instead of asking 'what what I do if I was Min Aung Hlaing?', it would have been better for us to ask 'what have been the drivers of the Myanmar military’s behaviour in recent decades?' 7/

This is written with benefit of hindsight and I'm NOT SAYING that I predicted the coup. Nor am I trying to sub-tweet any particular analysts. Rather, I think it's a useful moment for us to ponder how and why we think and write the way we do, a la Heuer 8/ https://www.ialeia.org/docs/Psychology_of_Intelligence_Analysis.pdf

The lesson that major intelligence failures are often caused by deficiencies in analysis not collection is one of ten lessons from the history of espionage that I have drawn out in my latest newsletter. My lessons are based on Prof Andrew's great book. END https://benbland.substack.com/p/ten-lessons-from-the-history-of-espionage