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President Biden said the war in Yemen “created humanitarian and strategic catastrophe” and directed the State Department to support U.N. efforts to “impose a ceasefire, open humanitarian channels, and restore long-dormant peace talks.” 1/x
To achieve that end, Biden is placing pressure on Saudi Arabia: “This war has to end! And to underscore our commitment ending all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen including relevant arms sales.” 2/x
This leads to a key question: does the U.S. have much leverage to influence Saudi Arabian behavior by withholding arms? Arms transfers & security cooperation are the topic of my upcoming @CSISDefense360 #Transition46 piece. Look for it Tuesday. https://defense360.csis.org/series/transition46/ 3/x
First, while she was at CSIS @natsecdalton suggested a framework for applying conditions on security assistance is likely to work. While Saudi Arabia is not reliant on U.S. financing for its purchases, many of the same principles apply. 4/x https://www.csis.org/analysis/smart-conditions
The Trump admin. argued against cutoffs, saying “[o]ur adversaries, including Russia and China, have adopted deliberate, long-term strategies of trying to disrupt our partnerships by seeking to replace the United States as the credible supplier of choice.” https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/071019_Cooper_Testimony1.pdf
How seriously should we take this argument? There's some support for the idea that in a more multipolar world with competing sellers, the U.S. has less leverage. Dalton identifies alternate patrons as one of the 2 "[m]ost critical variables" for undercutting conditions.
. @CooleyOnEurasia & @dhnexon explore the concept of "exit options" in detail noting “[e]ven when states do not actively switch patrons, the possibility that they could provides them with greater leverage.” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends 8/x
Increasing arms supplier competition does make this general argument relevant to this specific case. So does that mean that the cutoff grants the Biden administration little leverage? To judge that question we need to take closer look at Saudi Arabia's purchases. 9/x
In this graph, the dotted line shows arms sales agreement, the solid lines represent deliveries. The extent of purchases is not new. Saudi Arabia & the UAE have both long bought high-end NATO-compatible equipment and that makes up the bulk of their inventories. 10/x
Biden referenced this when he said “Saudi Arabia faces missile attacks, UAV strikes, & other threats from Iranian-supplied forces in multiple countries. We’re going to continue to support and help Saudi Arabia defend its sovereignty, its territorial integrity, & its people.” 10/x
High-end modern weapon systems greatly rely on networks & interoperability. China, and Russia in particular, do sell *some* more advanced equipment, but they won't be compatible with inventories that Saudi Arabia has bought from the U.S. and Europe. 11/x
A world w/ many producers of advanced tech. makes controlling dual-use tech hard. But for weapons, the U.S. has sharp export controls & intellectual property tools. As @PatentsforPower covers, these are primarily for tech. security, but are quite potent. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo52781593.html
All of this means that Saudi Arabia cannot easily transition away from its present fleets. That does not guarantee that the effort to wind down the war in Yemen will succeed, look at the Turkey S-400 case. But the U.S. does have real leverage. https://defense360.csis.org/the-great-unwinding-the-u-s-turkey-arms-sales-dispute/ (fin).
