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Pleased to kick off NAEI's new series, testing the assumptions underlying U.S. foreign policy debate!
My first article gets back to basics on IR theory and looks at our assumptions about the roots of great power competition.
Thread: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/assumption-testing-series/assumption-1-revisionist-states-are-the-cause-of-great-power-competition/
My first article gets back to basics on IR theory and looks at our assumptions about the roots of great power competition.
Thread: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/assumption-testing-series/assumption-1-revisionist-states-are-the-cause-of-great-power-competition/
We all make assumptions about foreign policy, and are subject to groupthink.
NAEI aims to perform the function of a red cell for Washington policy debates, drawing on our founder @matburrows experiences in the IC to challenge these assumptions. 2/x https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/30/inside-the-cia-red-cell-micah-zenko-red-team-intelligence/
NAEI aims to perform the function of a red cell for Washington policy debates, drawing on our founder @matburrows experiences in the IC to challenge these assumptions. 2/x https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/30/inside-the-cia-red-cell-micah-zenko-red-team-intelligence/
In that spirit, this paper does two things:
1) Lays out the current consensus in Washington on GPC in the participants own words. No strawmen arguments here!
2) Takes that argument apart to look at what makes it tick: why is this is the common wisdom on, eg, China? 3/x
1) Lays out the current consensus in Washington on GPC in the participants own words. No strawmen arguments here!
2) Takes that argument apart to look at what makes it tick: why is this is the common wisdom on, eg, China? 3/x
To summarize in laymen's terms: Washington strategy documents increasingly suggest we're headed for a more dangerous world of great power competition. Why? Revisionist states which seek to challenge international order.
It's a problematic assumption. 4/x https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/assumption-testing-series/assumption-1-revisionist-states-are-the-cause-of-great-power-competition/
It's a problematic assumption. 4/x https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/assumption-testing-series/assumption-1-revisionist-states-are-the-cause-of-great-power-competition/
This is the classic debate of security studies: the actions of states like Russia, China, or Iran could be aggressive. But they could also be based in insecurity and uncertainty.
It's not a new debate. But we rarely talk about it explicitly, and there's value to doing so. 5/x
It's not a new debate. But we rarely talk about it explicitly, and there's value to doing so. 5/x
Because while the concepts are abstract, the policy implications are not.
Assuming that aggression (not uncertainty) is the root of GPC shuts off various policy responses, leaving only maximalist options: military buildup, economic decoupling, diplomatic isolation. 6/x
Assuming that aggression (not uncertainty) is the root of GPC shuts off various policy responses, leaving only maximalist options: military buildup, economic decoupling, diplomatic isolation. 6/x
And if we are wrong, history suggests that these overreactions could end up spiraling into conflict.
As IR OG Bob Jervis puts it: “the policies that flow from deterrence theory... are just those that, according to the spiral model, are most apt to heighten tensions.” 7/x
As IR OG Bob Jervis puts it: “the policies that flow from deterrence theory... are just those that, according to the spiral model, are most apt to heighten tensions.” 7/x
So if we are uncertain about the scope of Chinese or Russian intentions, what can we do?
Hedge.
The paper suggests four buckets of policy response that would be useful in either case (aggression or uncertainty)! 8/x
Hedge.
The paper suggests four buckets of policy response that would be useful in either case (aggression or uncertainty)! 8/x
If you only take away one thing from this paper, it's this: the assumptions you make about other states have real-world policy implications.
You can read the whole thing here. 9/x
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Ashford-Assumption-Assumption-1-Revisionist-States-Great-Power-Competition_Issue-Bief_210127_FV.pdf
You can read the whole thing here. 9/x
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Ashford-Assumption-Assumption-1-Revisionist-States-Great-Power-Competition_Issue-Bief_210127_FV.pdf
And if you're more of an auditory learner, check out this nifty video that @capreble and I recorded talking about the paper. 10/x
You can learn more about the whole assumptions testing series, and what NAEI is trying to do in the Washington policy debate here. 11/x https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/scowcroft-center-for-strategy-and-security/new-american-engagement-initiative/assumption-testing-series/
