Spent a few hours reading the Soviet records on the deep freeze in Soviet-US relations in the early 1980s. Moscow resented US pressure on human rights, on Afghanistan, on Poland. The collective "Brezhnev" rained vitriol about US "interference" in the Soviet internal affairs.

But one thing is striking: just how desperate the Soviets were to wiggle their way out of their growing isolation, just how desperately they craved for better times, as what they had in the early 1970s, when Nixon hosted Brezhnev in the US as a leader of a co-equal superpower.

They badly wanted that recognition, that engagement. It was not just a question of lifting economic sanctions, though - true- sanctions damaged the Soviet economy. It was rather a question of being accepted in the West because this acceptance translated into increased legitimacy.

For a time at least, they were not willing to compromise on key issues e.g. Afghanistan and Poland - but only for a time. Bubbling up from below was their keen interest in reengagement, which came to the fore when Gorbachev came to power.

The point is: even when relations with the US were at their worst, there was understanding in the Soviet elites that this freeze was not, as their propaganda claimed, all the fault of US reactionaries; rather, Moscow shouldered a heavy share of responsibility for its predicament.

Gorbachev's shifting of gears in the mid-1980s can be seen largely as a response to Moscow's international isolation. In other words, when people say: we can't do much about Russia. Russia is not the West's to gain or lose - they are only partially correct.

Yes, Russia is not the West's to gain or lose. But it is the West's to recognise. By keeping up the pressure and denying the regime the international recognition that it badly craves, the West can and will contribute to the reorientation of Russian foreign policy.

Keep up the pressure.