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The NDS already has a framework for making trades across mission areas and timelines that Gens Brown & Berger describe here. What's needed is for leadership to fill that framework out with useful data, and then use it to make decisions. 1/25 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/02/01/brown-berger-military-readiness/
So, while I applaud the Generals' intent, and share their goals, we must acknowledge that a lack of a framework isn't what's causing DoD to prioritize near-term readiness over long-term readiness. So what is the issue? Or, more precisely, issues? 2/25
1st is persistent CCMD demands for forces, and particularly CENTCOM force demands. They devour the supply of ready forces, creating an ouroboros of readiness spending. There is no space for pulling units out of this cycle to prepare for longer-term challenges. 3/25
This would be less of an issue if OSD, supported by the Joint Staff, pushed back harder on CCMD demands but such pushback has been rare of late, and usually not very steadfast: see the Gulf odyssey of the USS Nimitz. 4/25
To make matters worse, the CCMDs and JS are atrocious when it comes to tracking or sharing detailed data about force demands, utilization, and readiness. The data is so jumbled and badly parsed that it could at once tell you nothing, or whatever story you wished to tell. 5/25
The demand side of the readiness equation clearly has problems, but the Service supply side isn't off the hook when it comes to prioritizing the present over the future. 6/25
The Services, most explicitly the Navy, like having excess demand for their forces, because it bolsters their arguments for more force structure & end strength, and a greater share of the DoD budget. 7/25
The Services' readiness data is often just as flawed as the data tracking force utilization. Readiness can therefore become a subjective measure prone to manipulation, either to argue for more money, or to paper over serious flaws (e.g., PACFLT readiness in 2017). 8/25
Much of this behavior comes from the Chiefs' focus on simple numbers as a reflection of the success of their Service. 355 ships. 386 squadrons. 500k soldiers. 200k marines and 38 amphibs. 9/25
To their credit, most of the current Chiefs have backed away from these targets, but the sentiment remains and permeates their bureaucracies. And the only way to meet these targets is to hold onto "affordable" legacy equipment. 10/25
Given current budget trends, there may not be enough money to replace existing platforms, let alone build a larger future force. There is no Reaganesque "peacetime" buildup coming, and even if it were, it would largely go to personnel and O&M. 11/25
The Services have also not exactly crowned themselves in glory when it comes to the "transformative modernization" Gens Brown and Berger argue for. Every Service has a closet full of failed modernization programs from the "Force Transformation" push of the 2000s. 12/25
This isn't to say DoD should eschew change, but it helps explain why Service Chiefs and modernization advocates face an uphill climb in divesting existing force structure to invest in future technology. 13/25
OSD also shoulders responsibility. Post-Cold War DoD strategy & guidance often prioritized everything. Preserve capacity for 2 wars. Prioritize readiness to respond to crises. "Win" in IRQ, AFG, and vs. VEOs. Invest in game-changing capabilities. And defend the homeland. 14/25
And do all of this with skyrocketing personnel & O&M costs. This left very little trade-space and, given the centrality of the 2-war construct and the immediate demands of the wars and homeland defense... The future got squeezed. 15/25
Moreover, the process that manages change to the future force--PPBE--is designed for methodical programmatic oversight, not visionary strategic shifts. And it's almost completely disconnected from the operations/force deployment processes like SDOBs. 16/25
This means OSD has often used the force according to one set of priorities, while building a future force based on a different set of priorities. Without a formal coordination or feedback mechanism, immediate issues usually win out over important future challenges. 17/25
OSD has tried to fix this in many ways, including "ceilings" on deployments and the 2018 NDS' Force-Management and Planning Construct balancing day-to-day competition with future demands. But these constructs don't implement themselves--they need leadership focus. 18/25
Finally, Congress has generally preserved "legacy" force structure and current programs at the expense of future readiness. Sometimes, this is due to skepticism regarding future programs. More often, it's out of a parochial desire to protect jobs in their districts. 19/25
Congress' view of DoD as a source for jobs and economic development is understandable, but it badly distorts U.S strategy and, more often than not, prioritizes the immediate over the important. 20/25
I applaud Gens Brown and Berger for their visions and their willingness to break china (pun intended), and I'd offer any meager assistance I can in their mission. But first, I'd offer that their problem diagnosis is flawed. 21/25
DoD doesn't lack a framework, or a strategy to prioritize future, vice near-term readiness. Instead future advocates in DoD face the gantlet of trials, obstacles, antibodies, and process traps I've laid out above, and many more that I've missed. 22/25
What DoD has lacked is 1) a systemic appraisal of these barriers; 2) a plan to break down, evade, or co-opt these barriers; and 3) a leadership cadre with the time, inclination, and political capital to enact this plan. (The 3rd Offset might offer a good case study here.) 23/25
Change is needed urgently if DoD is to meet China's challenge. To get where we need to go, leaders like Gens Brown and Berger will need to understand where we've been, what we've tried, why it worked or failed, and how their efforts can succeed. I wish them Godspeed. 24/25
