Very, very interesting.

#HTS & its leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani have just finished hosting @FrontlinePBS's @Martin28Smith in #Idlib for 3 days.

How times change -- quite a difference from 2014/15. https://twitter.com/Martin28Smith/status/1356621851984863240

#pt: It's no secret that #HTS has been pushing hard behind-the-scenes for opportunities to improve its image abroad -- first in outreach to researchers/institutes & more recently giving top access to highly-regarded media outlets.

And fwiw, PBS is one of several.

#pt: That #HTS is pushing this shouldn't come as a surprise -- the ingredients were put in place as far back as 2015, when a prolonged internal debate regarding the right path for Jabhat al-Nusra began. Clerical "lobby groups" got involved & then #JFS was created; then #HTS.

#pt: #HTS hasn't moderated its foundational ideology, but it has pivoted entirely to a localized agenda in which governance measures at least as important as efforts in the military sphere.

The break with #AlQaeda is/was real, but the impetus was largely for self-preservation.

#pt: The vast majority of Syrians in the NW continue to distrust #HTS & he definitely doesn't represent their revolution -- but the success of #Jolani's governance project in #Idlib is almost certainly the only hope left for preventing a full regime conquest -- a grim irony.

#pt: 3yrs ago, I was told #Jolani had begun using "Liberated Northern #Syria" to describe the NW & was also proposing this zone elect a "Prime Minister" -- anathema to jihadists.

Today, #HTS runs a semi-technocratic "Salvation Government" & conducts CT ops vs. #AlQaeda & #ISIS.

#pt: 2yrs ago, I learned of unofficial outreach efforts from #HTS to a number of Western governments & began to be asked by some whether it was "time" to engage in "exploratory dialogues." (I said no)

I now understand some engagement has occurred. This also should be a surprise.

#pt: When U.S. diplomats have spent months on end negotiating over a shared table with the #Taliban, #HTS gambled that it too could achieve a similar level of legitimacy.

The #Taliban model has been talked about in #Syria before -- years back by another group: Ahrar al-Sham.

#pt: In public & (mostly) closed settings, I began suggesting that #Nusra/ #JFS/ #HTS was heading in this direction in early-'16.

My point was to warn of the challenge this'd present - it'd undermine moderates, risk justifying a major assault & force us into an impossible dilemma.

#pt: I wrote and said repeatedly that thus evolving #Nusra represented the primary threat to #Syria's opposition for a reason -- because once it gains traction & achieves some level of local dominance, it'll prove immensely difficult to uproot.

That's definitely proven true.

#pt: Worse still, when jihadists "go local" & succeed in consolidating a dominant position, they create a dynamic in which any external CT campaign against them is almost certain to enhance their local credibility -- that's also proven true.

Hence today's effort to reform image.

#pt: Zoom out for a minute: with minimal hostilities, #Idlib is a dire humanitarian disaster. An outbreak of major fighting is hard to fathom.

If the international community wants to keep #Idlib stable, it's essentially impossible to envision how to do so w/o #HTS's cooperation.

#pt: And yet at the same time, #HTS remains a designated terrorist organization, albeit one that allows foreign (including U.S.) aid to be distributed throughout its territory; supports a modest COVID-19 response; & confronts both #AlQaeda & #ISIS.

It's an impossible quandary.

#pt: One last pt - it's hard to understate the enormous symbolic significance of this image in the jihadist world.

Until now, #HTS was condemned by #AlQaeda & #ISIS alike for its "nationalist" rhetoric & distancing from "true" jihad -- this picture makes that look insignificant.