THREAD: A toxic mix of vanity, ambition & naivety has led to the arrest of #SuuKyi & return to military rule in #Myanmar. The pall of the discarded 1990 election & 20 years of dictatorship now looms large. So is Tatmadaw really seizing power for 1 year only? 1/

At question here is the problem of the 2008 Constitution. The military designed it, and it is now the albatross holding back progress in a range of areas - from the 'peace process' and federalism, to citizenship, Presidential appointments etc 2/

The military wrote 2008 Constitution during dark days of dictatorship; it protects their interests via complete autonomy & 25% military seats in parliament. But to give popular legitimacy it also opened 75% of seats to election- vast bulk which #SuuKyi/NLD won in 2015 & 2020 3/

Two deeply flawed assumptions shaped how they set up the electoral system which paved the path to the current crisis. First, they believed they had done a GOOD job running the country (), and thus their proxy party USDP would do well in free elections 4/

Second, they thought that even when the USDP did *less well* at the ballot box, they could still regularly rule in coalition w/ the USDP by using their 25% of seats in Parliament to form government. They could then appoint senior military leaders to 'civilian' positions 5/

But they made a huge blunder: they chose a majoritarian rather than a proportional representation electoral system. FPTP rewards popular parties w/ support across constituencies (NLD). But it delivers few seats for parties w/ small, rusted-on & disbursed voter bases (USDP) 6/

This maths is VERY important. If the USDP were able to win 25% or more seats in parliament they could form government in partnership with military MPs. Tatmadaw would have the trifecta: investment, (semi)legitimacy & total command autonomy 7/

But their overconfidence (& naivety re electoral systems!) has instead seen the USDP win <10% of Union seats in 2015 & 2020 despite 20-30% of the popular vote. Meanwhile the NLD has received 80%+ of elected seats for 60-65% of vote share in both elections 8/

Cut to the current crisis. With wipe-outs in 2015&2020 the military & USDP have realized that the USDP could never win enough seats in current system to form coalition government with military. In other words, the system THEY DESIGNED is locking in NLD victories in perpetuity 9/

Dubious claims from USDP and military about 'electoral fraud', complaints about the Union Election Commission must be seen in this context. Basically, these guys naively designed their own political game and now are FURIOUS they cant win in all the ways they want 10/

This is where the toxic element of ambition comes in. Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing must retire this year. Whereas leaders of old dictatorship took respectable positions in 'civilian' gov between 2010- 2016 as President, Speakers of Parliament - he has nowhere to go 11/

After a career working his way up the ranks and blithely commanding atrocities, the current political system has little to offer him and older generation of Tatmadaw (they've few travel/posting ops abroad given their war crimes) 12/

So now he has seized power, will military really hold it for one year only? The question rests on their approach to the 2008 Constitution. They could *maybe* get away with tweaking a few things (like the electoral system) which help the USDP and ethnic parties win seats... 13/

But if they treat the 2008 Constitution as sacrosanct, and push on with bizarre claims of voter fraud (which is the justification for the coup), then Myanmar is in for a bumpy, bloody and possibly long ride- right in the middle of the worst economic downturn in decades 14/

To wrap up, the #Myanmarcoup is a cautionary tale. Regimes that rely on coercion & loyalty tend to overestimate their popularity, and make terrible decisions about how to govern. This creates tremendous instability and destroys the lives of ordinary people 15/

For Myanmar activists the only option now is to pile on pressure in hope Myanmar's military leaders put aside ambition and see that a rapid return to quasi-democracy - probably with a few tweaks - is the best path forward for everyone 16/

For internationals, the best we can do is support ongoing scrutiny of the coup from within Myanmar. So SUBSCRIBE to outlets like @FrontierMM and donate to @Myanmar_Now_Eng https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/donate  17/17