My doctoral research project is centered in private law doctrine. I love what I study. But for the last few weeks, I've been wondering if one can be a 'good' doctrinal scholar in law without engaging seriously with legal history? (1/8)

I've read some inspiring doctrinal works which don't do too much legal history, and, till recently, I hadn't read much of the latter at all. (2/8)

But on recently engaging with some historical material, I'm starting to recognise the contingency of legal rules I'm thinking about, and also (possibly) of works that have influenced me so much that look at those rules without taking their history seriously. (3/8)

One of the great things about my legal education in India, and on the Oxford BCL, was the grip it taught me to acquire on the positive law. But save a few courses I took, legal history was slipped-in only in an incidental way, almost like a footnote or 'fun fact' of sorts. (4/8)

My recent engagement with legal history has shown me how frail some of my convictions are, how limited my articulation of them has been. (5/8)

It has caused me to recognise the vastness of my subject, to ask more questions, to dwell on them more seriously, and not to be anxious about 'promptly' finding 'right' answers at every turn. (6/8)

Comparative or inter-disciplinary approaches to the law may have a similar effect. But examining a subject against external standards is very different from examining it according to its own standards (properly understood -- 'its own history'). (7/8)

The latter quality, I'm starting to think, is what makes legal history of distinct interest to a student of the positive law (or to this one, at least). (8/8)