#Syria's regime appears to be facing a sharp increase in public criticism from across its population - people are exasperated at rife corruption & incompetence.

In lieu of this, secret police have been behind a spate of arrests targeting prominent critics, many of them #Alawite.
#pt: While some observers in the West [inaccurately] attribute #Syria's deep economic crisis to sanctions, #Assad's "loyalist critics" don't appear to be convinced -- they've been laying the blame squarely at the regime & parliament's doorsteps.

i.e. the propaganda is faltering.
#pt: No matter where you look in #Assad-held areas, the regime is clearly unable to provide, govern, secure or stabilize.

For the many Syrians who've stood by the regime since '11, their sacrificed 'blood & treasure' appear to have been merely for Bashar -- no reciprocal award.
#pt: From the Syrians I know who've remained in #Assad-held territories since '11, there are 2 main assertions:

1) There is truly no light at the end of the tunnel, absolutely no prospect for hope.

2) The height of the war in '14-15 was easier than facing today's challenges.
#pt: Economic collapse next-door in #Lebanon catalyzed a financial crisis in #Syria based mainly on a lack of access to foreign currency (via #Beirut) - resulting in inflation (SYP now 3000:$1) & the death of the middle class.

Getting bread on the table is now a daily challenge.
#pt: The depreciation of the SYP has compounded #Syria's fuel crisis (as has pressure on #Iran's economy), leaving #Damascus unable to afford sufficient supplies, shipped in mainly from #Iran.

Plus subsidy cuts, declining imports & no domestic job creation/investments.
#pt: Faced by a seemingly irreversible economic spiral, neither #Russia or #Iran appear willing or able to bail #Assad out -- financially or via increased supplies.

For e.g - #Moscow has refused/held back wheat supplies despite the bread crisis & #Iran has refused new oil rates.
#pt: On the security side, southern #Syria is crumbling as #Russia's "reconciliation" strategy collapses in on itself -- its own "former rebel" proxies are attacking regime targets & blocking attempts to resolve local conflicts.

Plus rising anger in #Druze-majority #Suwayda.
#pt: The regime besieged, starved & carpet bombed #Daraa in mid-'18, coercing a mass surrender of #Syria's south.

Since then, it's provided zero aid & no stabilization assistance. #Iran & #Hezbollah flooded back, alongside #Assad loyalists. And Russia deployed 100 MPs.

= Chaos.
#pt: #Daraa was meant to be #Russia's case study in how to resolve #Syria's conflict -- instead, it exemplifies just how incapable #Moscow is in doing so. It simply co-opted rebels & gave them a new badge, only to breath new life into their outright hostility to #Assad & #Iran.
#pt: In the central 'Badiya', #ISIS is clearly resurging, thanks in large part to the pro-regime alliance's inability ( #Syria/ #Russia/ #Iran) to conduct an effective ISR/COIN campaign.

The trajectory here is *very* concerning & makes a mockery of the "leave it to #Russia" pitch.
#pt: Plus we have ongoing conflicts in NW, N & NE #Syria, plus #Turkey-Kurd & #Israel- #Iran hostilities.

Not to forget #COVID, no reconstruction, OPCW allegations, deepening corruption & a *major* humanitarian crisis on the near horizon: https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/1353747443440095239
#pt: Beyond #Syria, another issue worthy of serious attention is refugees -- nearly 6 million of which show zero sign of returning, thus placing a permanent & unsustainable strain on #Turkey, #Lebanon & #Jordan.

For many reasons, we simply cannot accept they're staying forever.
#pt: All of this thread makes clear that #Syria's crisis is a long, long way from being resolved & assuming today's trajectory is sustained (frankly, it's likely to worsen), serious instability & regional spillover is - again - inevitable.

That cannot be allowed to transpire.
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