I've seen a lot of confusion about these points relative to the US- #Taliban agreement, so let's delve into them a bit more in this THREAD. 1/n #Afghanistan https://twitter.com/AlexWardVox/status/1355198054668906498

(First, a caveat: I'm relying on the public text of the US- #Taliban agreement. We know there are several "secret annexes" to it, which I have not seen. However, based on various officials' statements about them, I'm doubtful they'd change much here.) 2/n https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf

First, on "cutting ties to #alQaeda." This is a popular phrase/sentiment but also a popular misconception. The US- #Taliban agreement DOES NOT require the TB to "cut ties" with any group. It DOES require the following:
- No use of #Afghanistan soil to threaten the US/allies 3/n

- Instruct #Taliban members not to cooperate w/groups threatening the US/allies
- Prevent such groups from recruiting, training, & fundraising in #Afghanistan
- No hosting of such groups
- No asylum or immigration of such groups' members (incl issuing of govt-like docs) 4/n

Now, one might read that list & think it pretty much adds up to cutting ties...but the deal doesn't say "cut ties" & the #Taliban have proven to be very strict in their interpretation of the deal to date. There's a lot of ambiguity in this list as well. 5/n

IMO, the most notable clause that the #Taliban have arguably violated is the "no hosting" aspect, since there have been numerous examples of #alQaeda leaders killed at TB safe houses/controlled areas since the agreement was signed (e.g., see link). 6/n https://www.wsj.com/articles/key-al-qaeda-leader-killed-in-afghanistan-11603626009

The counterargument that I've seen/heard from #Taliban defenders is that the group sees it commitments in Part 2 of the US-TB agreement as "conditions-based" subject to the same timeline as the US drawdown of forces. 7/n

In other words, that they don't have to be in full compliance w/those commitments until 1 May 2021. However, the deal doesn't say this. Rather, it says the #Taliban will take these steps "in conjunction with the announcement of this agreement." 8/n
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf

Second, on ceasefires. The public text only mentions a ceasefire once, as Part 3 of a comprehensive peace agreement. It says a ceasefire will be an agenda item of negotiations--incl date, modalities & mechanisms--but announcement would happen alongside a political roadmap. 9/n

It says nothing about where in the agenda item list a ceasefire would/should fall. It also says nothing about "reductions in violence." My understanding from some who were close to the talks is that the US conveyed an *expectation* of a RiV, but didn't get that in writing. 10/n

Third, on engaging in "real talks." The deal is silent on this. All it says is that the #Taliban & Afghan govt would begin talks on 10 MAR 2020. Obviously that was delayed by 6 months, but it did eventually happen. 11/n

The deal, however, says nothing about the pace of progress for the intra-Afghan negotiations. The only two items it specifies for discussion are a ceasefire & a political roadmap. 12/n

One could argue, I suppose, that if the #Taliban are not bringing proposals to the table on these two items, then they're not engaging in good-faith efforts at talks. The same criticism could presumably be levied at the Afghan govt, though. 13/n

What does all this mean? IMO, the US is on firmest ground WRT the #Taliban's cont'd "hosting" of #alQaeda & its obligations under Part 2 of the agreement. 14/n

The other two parts of @jakejsullivan's remarks are more in line with a US/Afghan govt view that the #Taliban haven't engaged in "good faith" behaviors regarding the talks/haven't met US *expectations* that were stated verbally to the TB by @US4AfghanPeace. 15/n

The #Taliban will argue against all of these aspects, so it'll be incumbent on the US to provide compelling evidence against one/more of the claims. I suspect the strongest will be against TB "hosting" of #alQaeda, though that may require release of intelligence to prove. 16/n

Regardless, one thing is sure: we're not going to see much/any progress in the intra-Afghan negotiations until the US' review is complete & all sides know what US intentions are for #Afghanistan going forward. 17/17