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In case you missed this telling development: the parliament of the Primorsky Krai changed the region's electoral law to increase the number of single-mandate districts (from 20 to 30) to the detriment of seats allocated by proportional representation. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4662740
This happened at the behest of United Russia deputies, no doubt in an attempt to lock in the governing party's majority in the regional parliament. I have recently written about the importance of SMDs for United Russia. http://www.noyardstick.com/?p=848
Recently several regions increased the share of SMDs in their electoral systems: Khabarovsk, Tula, Kostroma, Kirov, Lipetsk, Mari El and the Altai Republic. In the Amur Oblast deputies have recently reduced the number of deputies, which may be a prelude to redrawing the system.
At the extreme end of the scale was the city of Vladimir, which switched to a purely majoritarian system for its municipal elex, which resulted in a local council made up entirely of United Russia. Opposition movements formed an "alternative council": https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4564795
It seems possible that we will see similar changes in regions where United Russia's popularity is falling. Perhaps even on the federal level where it is possible to change electoral legislation up until May.
https://www.ng.ru/politics/2021-01-26/3_8066_law.html
https://www.ng.ru/politics/2021-01-26/3_8066_law.html
As I discussed in August, tinkering with electoral rules shortly before parliamentary elections has become almost a tradition in Russia. By changing how votes are translated into seats, one can preserve a democratic facade and reduce the need for rigging. http://www.noyardstick.com/?p=760
As Tsar Nicholas proclaimed in 1907 when the 2nd Duma was dismissed and new electoral rules imposed, the old electoral system "did not truly express the needs and desires of the people, and this was due to the novelty of the situation and to defects in the electoral law". Right.
There are two caveats. First, even as the Kremlin relies on tinkering anr rigging to produce the needed numbers, it also needs to keep an eye on the legitimacy gap, i.e. the result has to resemble actual preferences enough so that a critical number of voters can live with them.
Second, relying on SMDs works only as long as the opposition vote is divided. Navalny's "smart voting" - building on the success of four unexpected electoral upsets in the regions in 2018 - attacked exactly this vulnerability.
These may not look like serious threats, but the legitimacy gap has gradually grown over the past years & there are multiple triggers that may lead to an escalation. Second, smart voting doesn't need to work everywhere, only in a critical number of districts, which is w/i reach.
This puts the Kremlin in an uncomfortable situation. Yes, the legitimacy gap can be narrowed by allowing more (controlled) competition, but loosen your grip on the party system too much & you have a bunch of new parties taking seats away United Russia.
This means that it might make sense for UR to tweak the system in a way that allows more parties to win seats in the proportional vote, but simultaneously reduce the share of those seats in the Duma: a more "diverse" parliament where UR would nonetheless preserve its majority.
But let me repeat: this would hardly be more than a technical change and would not resolve the question of smart voting for the Kremlin (yes, the smart voting app will almost certainly be banned, but Telegram, coupled with active local networks can bridge that gap).
Therefore I expect that, even if we see more tweaks to electoral legislation between now and May, the authorities will rely much more significantly on administrative pressure and rigging. Which will possibly also mean a shake-up (read: dismissals) in key regions.
