As penance to the timeline, y'all want a little thread about solidarity in frankfurt school thought?

Obviously, all of the members are indebted to Durkheim's theory of mechanical and organic solidarity (from Division of Labor in Society)
Mechanical: an integrative force composed by people based on some shared worldview
Organic: is reliance on others
http://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/Class%20Readings/Durkheim/Division%20Of%20Labor%20Final%20Version.pdf

Most importantly, imo, is Durkheim's insistence that solidarity *not* be psychologized or moralized, pretty much every frankfurter follows that lead. The pictures of solidarity almost always lack affect or moral orientation and are instead pictures of social organization.

For Adorno, solidarity is both moral and political. Solidarity is a basic moral relation where we recognize shared vulnerability. It's also a political relation where we work together to make the bonds bw different individuals into a real reliance accompanied by recognition.

Adorno's writing on solidarity is sporadic, but he is against what he calls 'forced unity' and argues aporetically that solidarity is when the heterogeneous is not expelled or exterminated (mostly in minima moralia but also in 'society') "It was manifested by people who together-

put their lives at stake, counting their own concerns as less important in face of a tangible possibility, so that, without being possessed by an abstract idea, but also without individual hope, they were ready to sacrifice themselves for each other"

Habermas takes up solidarity in a *much* more durkheimian form--arguing that solidarity just is the integrative force necessary to make individuals into a society that is capable of legitimation. Solidarity lacks all affective elements and

it doesn't seem to be the sort of thing that can be forced (again, this is consistent!) by law or otherwise.

But it's crucial for Habermas' theory of legitimation, especially in Between Facts and Norms. It is effectively what shows our political associations are voluntary ones.

Lots of people take up this debate from Habermas, including Brunkhorst, Pensky, and Fraser (probably most notably). Brunkhorst and Pensky are both fairly fidelitous in applying Habermas' theory of solidarity to various political/moral problems.

The project is an interesting one, especially because for Habermas, solidarity isn't a moral injunction or something like that, it just *is* or *isn't*. It's what gives us reason to care about each other, because we see that our fates are shared or we depend on each other.

Pensky does a nice job of applying the framework to a series of pressing social and political issues that all hinge on questions concerning integration ( https://www.sunypress.edu/p-4571-the-ends-of-solidarity.aspx)

Brunkhorst takes up the question and applies it to international law and constitutionalism, asking how it is that we could form the right kind of constitutency for a meaningful international legal regime. ( https://www.google.com/books/edition/Solidarity/dpP0erNeZyoC?hl=en)

Fraser's contribution is brief, but it is clear that she ended up taking far more interest in Honneth's concerns ab solidarity, than about Habermas's. She posits solidarity as a relationship through which those who are excluded can force narrative resources to express their needs

( https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/2008/HSS08_Fraser.pdf)
In fact, this paper is actually a reply to Benhabib's argument that solidarity is a 'community of common needs' ( https://www.amazon.com/Critique-Norm-Utopia-Foundations-Critical/dp/023106165X) required to supplement formal deliberative democratic procedures.

Honneth's position is far more odd, here, it's a thoroughly utopian understanding of the concept. He uses it frequently and in near all cases it boils down to solidarity exists when the individual can be recognized in her particularity for her role in the general society.

This is actually not far from Adorno's conception (tbh) and it's stated most clearly in The Struggle for Recognition--unclear if it is meant to be a regulative ideal or just an ideal ( https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/struggle-recognition)

Amy Allen's "The Power of Feminist Theory" is kind of an outlier, even though she's clearly a frankfurter. She develops a theory of feminist solidarity, explicitly, as a form of building power-with.

She's the only one to really combine the idea of solidarity with power theory

Though, both Fraser and Benhabib are, like her, indebted in some way to Arendtian conceptions of politics/political action. ( https://www.routledge.com/The-Power-of-Feminist-Theory-Domination-Resistance-Solidarity/Allen/p/book/9780813365558#:~:text=Table%20of%20Contents-,Book%20Description,crucial%20concept%20for%20feminist%20theory.&text=The%20conception%20of%20power%20developed,these%20three%20modalities%20of%20power.)

Okay, I'm sure I've left some stuff out (especially all the stuff about solidarity and integration in the EU and the post-secularism stuff), but that's all for now.