The full version of this anonymously authored "Longest Telegram" is fascinating in some ways, but the attempt to claim Kennan's mantle is hobbled by questionable assumptions and logical contradictions. Thread: (1/x) https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/the-longer-telegram/
Especially problematic: the contradiction b/w two of its broad claims: on one hand, that we shouldn't view China as "some sort of monochrome political monolith" (absolutely correct) and, on the other, that all Chinese policymakers are "innately realist" & "fearful" (unlikely) 2/x
But it is also odd to so confidently assert that resistance in the CCP to Xi's rule is substantial enough to offer leverage for US strategists. Certainly there is disagreement, but every time we thought opponents might restrain Xi, he's simply arrogated more power to himself. 3/x
Also questionable: the assertion, without argument, that China is seeking to revise the fundamentals of the international system; in IR theory terms that “China under Xi, unlike under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, is no longer a status quo power.” 4/x
To be fair, many would agree w/ the claim that "Xi has demonstrated that he intends to project China’s authoritarian system, coercive foreign policy, and military...well beyond his country’s own borders." But several empirical studies have found that China tends status quo: 5/x
For instance:
Johnston in 2003: https://doi.org/10.1162/016228803321951081
Kastner and Saunders in 2012: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00697.x
Cha, Hu, & He in 2018: https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118804622
6/x
Johnston in 2003: https://doi.org/10.1162/016228803321951081
Kastner and Saunders in 2012: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00697.x
Cha, Hu, & He in 2018: https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118804622
6/x
So at best this claim seems highly contestable: "An authoritarian state in a position of global leadership will not only lead to the demise of the current order, but will, in the process, curtail US interests as well." 7/x
And I don't know where to start with the claim that China assuming a leadership role would "degrade the American soul, including the innate understanding of who Americans are as a people and what the nation stands for in the world." What does this even mean? 8/x
There's also a whiff of Orientalism in the piece's portrayal of the Chinese as strategic masterminds: China as a "master of strategic opacity," or that "Chinese strategy, informed by its own classical tradition, is fundamentally realist." 9/x
None of this is to say there aren't good proposals in the piece (it's long enough to contain multitudes, frankly). In particular, it is absolutely correct to emphasize that the US needs a clear strategy to strengthen itself in addition to a strategy to pressure China. 10/x
And I applaud the attempt to propose a comprehensive, forward-looking US strategy on China. As many have noted, the need for this is urgent (11/x): https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/washington-needs-a-bold-rethink-of-its-china-strategy/
But I hope we can do better than this Atlantic Council piece. 12/12