1. How *might* Myanmar's South Asian & northern neighbours react *if* the Tatmadaw ousts Suu Kyi in a coup? This is an imp ques given the state of the world at the moment, & many a geopolitical "plate-fulls" for most big powers. A quick, admittedly speculative, thread:

2. China: Unlikely to be happy w/ it, & might even view it as antithetical to its interests in the short term. The coup would reflect the limits of Beijing's influence in & conflict resolution capacities in its own neighbourhood. Why?

3. The Tatmadaw has been v. unhappy with Beijing's alleged support for EAOs (esp. the AA) in recent years. But, it has been more worried about ASSK's reliance on Beijing to counter T'daw domestically (in addition to maintaining, even increasing her popular Bamar-centric base).

4. She essentially signalled to the Senior-General that she can outplay the mil. in its own game of xenophobic-nationalism. It seemed to be working for sometime. For now, that has changed, & ASSK's over-confidence (?) might backfire hugely, unless Beijing truly intervenes.

5. For the sake of CMEC, Beijing views ASSK as a leader it can influence in the face of stiff opposition on the ground. The Tatmadaw, though dependent on China, is more independent in its political streak, & has sought international balancing vis-a-vis Beijing v. aggressively.

6. India: Will be equally concerned about a coup as it is difficult to ascertain what happens next. But, ironically, will be less concerned in a geopolitical sense. This is simply because it invested *a lot* in the Tatmadaw, & has had a complicated relationship w/ ASSK at best.

7. Unlike 1988 when India took a pro-NLD/democracy ideological stand, in 2021, it is likely to pay lip-service to this idea (at most!) while consolidating ties w/ Tatmadaw. All serious concerns (& there will be many!) are likely to be raised *behind closed doors*.

8. The coup, if it happens, will discredit the advocacy of *not isolating* Myanmar internationally, & that a slow but sure engagement w/ the Tatmadaw might bring incremental democratic reforms. Not after this. A coup now means: there was opportunity for that, but not anymore.

9. What India might desire, as things evolve, is an SG (AMH or some other figure?) w/ the temperament of former President Thein Sein i.e. someone who is conscious about maintaining internal sociopolitical inclusivity (diff. from electoral democracy) & external strat. balancing.

10. Such internal inclusivity & external balancing fits w/ India's geopolitical thrust of 'Act East', & can possibly be 'sold' to allies in D.C. & Europe (all of who have v. little leverage anyway on the Tatmadaw) to make it fit the larger Indo-Pacific strategy.

11. Bangladesh: We often miss how imp. Dhaka actually is in this whole saga. Bangladesh will take this coup the hardest. Not because it has much love for ASSK (on the contrary). But because such a development reduces the room for negotiation on the Rohingya issue even further.

12. Dhaka might use the coup to pressure both N. Delhi & Beijing (as well as Western capitals) to take harder punitive measures against T'daw. Even if it is unlikely to succeed, as an increasingly imp. trade & investment player, Dhaka might get the world to pay more attention.