Thomas Schelling's manipulation of risk concept is often used to explain brinkmanship pursued by leaders of states possessing nuclear weapons. What happened in India on 26th January can also be explained by the same concept. Thread. 1/n

India's govt, opposition parties, protesters, and a bunch of media houses are locked in a dangerous game. By deviating from decided routes, engaging in violence, and storming the Red Fort, the protesters decided to escalate the matter and openly invited retaliation. 2/n

A small retaliation (of some lathi-charge and tear gas usage here and there happened) happened but not a big one (eg: firing). Even this small retaliation could have gone out of hand. Two factors prevented that outcome. First, the govt decided to exercise restraint. 3/n

As a much stronger party, the govt calculated that it could suffer much losses (and several police personnel got injured) before it needed to retaliate strongly. This affects govt's credibility to respond sternly in future riots, and dilutes its reputation on law and order. 4/n

Second, luck played a role. The day that ended with one death (reportedly due to overturning of a tractor) could have easily ended with hundreds. The govt's strategy worked because of a tight centralized control over police force. 5/n

If a police officer at any place had thought that things are going out of control and had ordered to use greater force, things would have ended badly. Centralized control helped but is not always guaranteed when officers have to take decisions in crisis situations. 6/n

Things could have gone out of hand without either party (govt/police and protesters) wanting to go that way. This is what Schelling calls 'a threat that leaves something to chance'. A rumor or a piece of misinformation spread by third parties... 7/n

... could have led to instigation of steps that would have resulted in much higher number of deaths. All in all, India dodged a big bullet on Jan 26. It may not be this lucky in future such episodes. 8/8