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Plantinga's formulation of Anselm's OA, Coupled with Meinongianism (credits to @RiirReeRii):
1. God subsists but does not exist. (Assumption for reductio)
2. Existence in reality is greater than Subsistence. (Premise)
1/
1. God subsists but does not exist. (Assumption for reductio)
2. Existence in reality is greater than Subsistence. (Premise)
1/
3. A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality can subsist. (Premise)
4. A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality is greater than God. (From (1) and (2).)
5. A being greater than God can subsist. (From (3) and (4).)
2/
4. A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality is greater than God. (From (1) and (2).)
5. A being greater than God can subsist. (From (3) and (4).)
2/
6. It is false that a being greater than God can subsist. (From definition of “God”.)
7. Hence, it is false that God subsists but does not exist. (From (1), (5), (6).)
8. God subsists. (Premise, to which even the Fool agrees.)
9. Hence God exists in reality. (From (7), (8).)
3/
7. Hence, it is false that God subsists but does not exist. (From (1), (5), (6).)
8. God subsists. (Premise, to which even the Fool agrees.)
9. Hence God exists in reality. (From (7), (8).)
3/
The pull of this specific argument is that it has great resistance against some of the most pressing objections against Anselm's initial OA... 4/
(Greatness being a supervening, Second-Order property and therefore cannot be applied to non-existent objections, Kantian objections, etcetera.)
It's important to note here we don't need to commit ourselves to some hardcore meinongianism 5/
It's important to note here we don't need to commit ourselves to some hardcore meinongianism 5/
(Or generally follow in the footsteps of Meinong.) This argument works for Neo-meinongian views which make weaker ontological commitments and potentially Meinongian possibilism aswell. 6/
Other meinongian views might also escape the same objections and be able to run the same argument with slight re-wordings. 7/
Of course, the controversial thing here is just going to be Meinongianism itself, there has been some recent contemporary defense of Meinongianism, and it seems to still be a live position in Ontology, so ultimately I think this argument while a bit flimsy, is defensible.
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