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Today the newly established Office of the Intelligence Commissioner released its first annual report covering July-Dec 2019. A few important observations:
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/oic-bcr/documents/oic-annual-report-2019.pdf
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/oic-bcr/documents/oic-annual-report-2019.pdf
First, I find it odd that no foreign datasets were authorized for retention by the IC in 2019. Here's why:
S. 96 of the National Security Act 2017 (C-59) came into force by Order in Council on 12/07/19. Under the act this was "commencement day": the day the clock started ticking.
S. 96 of the National Security Act 2017 (C-59) came into force by Order in Council on 12/07/19. Under the act this was "commencement day": the day the clock started ticking.
From commencement day, CSIS had 90 days to apply for Ministerial authorization, and obtain IC approval to keep any foreign datasets it already had in its possession. That takes us to 12 October 2019.
Now- we know CSIS already had datasets because of the ODAC decision in 2017, but unclear if any of that associated data was, by definition, a foreign dataset. However, it seems odd that CSIS had *zero* foreign datasets in its possession on commencement day that it wanted to keep.
Alternatively, CSIS decided to trash its existing foreign datasets before the 90 days were up... OR asked for an extension. Now, I would think a request for an extension would also need to be IC approved since it's not contemplated by the Act. No mention of this in the report.
Second- 4 classes of Cdn datasets were authorized for collection by the IC. Meaning classes are likely defined broadly (similar to UK IPA), rather than narrowly. How broadly could lead to questions about how much of a check this really is on a collection of Cdn personal info.
Third. The IC has proven that the office is not a rubber stamp. In one case he determined that a Minister's decision to authorize certain unlawful conduct by CSIS to carry out its intel collection mandate was unreasonable; in another, it only partially approved the conduct. 
Finally, the IC is seemingly doing a good job of holding the Minister of National Defence to its obligations to articulate why CSE should be authorized to conduct foreign intelligence collection and cybersecurity activities- an important and augmented oversight role for the IC.
In some instances, the IC had to supplement the reasons, which is to a limited extent acceptable under administrative law. Nevertheless, I hope we see less need for this in the next annual report.
