Thread. Purpose of our study is to draw out some sensible (if still early) trends from publicly-available and comparable data. And to challenge the ‘infodemic’ of narratives and counter-narratives about what kinds of states are inherently better suited to combatting the virus. 1/ https://twitter.com/HerveLemahieu/status/1354511141192384513

No triumphalism. With 2 million+ deaths across 190 countries, it's clear most states outcompeted each other only by degrees of underperformance. Understanding this collective failure at international, national, sub-national level is critical in a still unfolding global crisis. 2/

My co-author @AlyssaLeng has a good thread on our findings: https://twitter.com/AlyssaLeng/status/1354529404311879681?s=20. Below, a few more nuggets of analysis from me. Our results point to strengths & vulnerabilities stemming from the way countries are set up to deal with a public policy challenge of this scale. 3/

But systemic factors alone – a society's regional provenance, political system, development status, or size – cannot account fully for differences observed. Political circumstances, policy choices & community buy-in appear to be just as important in shaping national responses. 4/

Cultural essentialism was largely debunked. There was no singular 'Western' experience. Europe was the most improved (and for a while the best performing) region until its 2nd wave. The Americas were the worst performing overall. US had more in common with Brazil than with EU. 5/

While the Asia-Pacific performed more effectively on average, the region remained highly stratified between success stories – NZ, Vietnam, Taiwan, Aus – and persistent strugglers. See thread by my colleague @benjaminbland for a case in point, Indonesia: https://twitter.com/benjaminbland/status/1354589048732438532?s=20 6/

Political systems had no substantial impact on outcomes, despite many fixating on US v China. Authoritarian regimes started strong. But on average democracies marginally outperformed alternatives. Real limits to strongman 'performance legitimacy'. Hybrid systems worst off. 7/

In terms of population, less appears to be more. Small countries (fewer than 10 million ppl) on average proved more agile. Larger ones tended to struggle partly because they could not close internal borders with same ease that small countries could ring fence external borders. 8/

No coincidence that 6 of the top-10 countries are island states. Australia benefitted from the good fortune of geography & good institutions. Moreover, we responded to the virus as 7-8 socially distanced micro nations –treating internal borders as if they were international. 9/

By contrast, Europe functioned almost as one country. Synchronous lockdowns across the continent successfully quelled the first wave, but more open borders (source of strength under most circumstances) left countries vulnerable to renewed outbreaks in neighbouring countries. 10/

Economic development had less impact than expected. Many rich countries were complacent at the outset, taking their health systems for granted. Many developing countries reacted with greater initial urgency. 'Low tech' measures (lockdowns) created a more level playing field. 11/

Likely we're now entering into a new chapter of the pandemic. Rich countries may soon leave the developing world behind in crisis recovery efforts with mass hoarding of promising COVID-19 vaccines. Doesn't bode well. See for example forecast of global vaccine coverage by EIU. 12/