The elimination of the Colmar Pocket—a 50 mi bulge in French First Army’s front in southern Alsace—was a priority for US 6th Army Group preliminary to crossing the Rhine River and entering Germany.
With the threat of approaching warmer weather that would turn frozen fields into quagmires, Gen. Jacob Devers, commanding 6 AG, knew that time was limited. He must eliminate the enemy salient by early February 1945.
Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, CG French First Army, did not need to convince his superior that his forces were stretched thin and worsted by the winter fighting. Devers obtained permission from SHAEF to reinforce de Lattre with US 3 & 28 IDs and 10 AD.
The operational concept behind what Devers’s staff called Operation Cheerful was an attack on both shoulders of the salient converging on Neuf-Brisach, seven miles east of Colmar. Neuf-Brisach contained the last standing bridge over the Rhine in 6 AG.
The terrain, weather, and enemy resistance all imposed challenges on 6 AG planners. Most of all, the numerous streams and rivers to be confronted by both wings of the advance required a major commitment of engineering assets, especially Bailey Bridges, which were in short supply.
French First Army had yet to replenish manpower losses from the winter fighting and gasoline, ammunition, and vehicle shortages threatened to impose delays on the offensive. The better condition of attached US divisions and the rapid resupply de Lattre’s forces forestalled delays
The offensive began on January 20, 1945 with de Lattre’s I Corps encountering blizzard conditions and stubborn enemy resistance. French attacks bogged down in the face of local counterattacks that contained de Lattre’s forces in the south.
In the north, de Lattre’s II Corps, supported by US 3 ID, achieved better results. 3 ID had been reinforced with the 254th Infantry of Task Force Harris, giving MG John W. O’Daniel four regiments to attack with.
Operation Grandslam required O’Daniel’s regiments to secure crossing sites over the Fecht and Ill Rivers as well as eliminate enemy pockets of resistance on the western banks.
1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, crossed the Ill River at the southeast corner of the Colmar Forest on the night of January 22-23 and began moving south down the east bank to secure the bridge site. While the wooden bridge proved sufficient for infantry, it would not support armor.
The battalion commander erred in assuming that the bridge could support armor and nixed the construction of an armored treadway bridge as originally planned. This decision would put Op Grandslam in peril as enemy armor closed on the American positions.
With his infantry “naked” on the east bank of the Ill, orders to bring up the bridging materials were given, but traffic jams imposed delays and the infantry were ordered to continue their advance without armored support.
All three battalions of 30th Infantry advanced headlong into a developing enemy counterattack by 708 VGD and 280th Assault Gun Bn. American armored troops watch in horror from the western bank as German tanks and assault guns sent 30th Infantry streaming back to the crossing site
The task of reclaiming the bridge site fell to the 15th Infantry, while 30th Infantry reorganized. Retracing 30th Infantry’s path of the previous day, 15th Infantry gained the crossing site and was subjected to another counterattack of the previous day’s magnitude.
This time, despite one company being overrun, the timely arrival of American tanks and tank destroyers retrieved the situation. Tanks firing from the west bank added to the fire support and the German attack was halted.
O’Daniel’s regiments engaged in what an official historian described as a series of “back-and-forth” actions over the next several days, enlarging its bridgehead and creating a bulge in the German hold on the salient. 3 ID was soon reinforced by 12 AD as the spearhead.
In the meantime, German Nineteenth Army suffered from poor intelligence regarding Allied strength and intentions. A partial withdrawal of the salient occurred simultaneously with a strengthening of the shoulders. A misreading of their enemy’s objectives hobbled the Germans.
When offensive operations resumed at the beginning of February, the muddled nature of German deployments negated their ability to respond to Allied attacks with sufficient strength, undermining their responsibility to hold the salient on their Hitler’s orders.

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