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THREAD: My @heritage paper on recommendations for Biden policy on North Korea. https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/biden-administration-must-address-daunting-north-korea-challengeAlliances.
The most immediate and significant U.S. policy priority should be to shore up alliances by resuming a traditional U.S. view of alliances that is based on shared values, (1/)
The most immediate and significant U.S. policy priority should be to shore up alliances by resuming a traditional U.S. view of alliances that is based on shared values, (1/)
principles, and objectives rather than seeing them as transactional relationships.
Seek incremental, rather than exponential, increases in allied contributions to offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces overseas. Abandon seeking to make a profit off (2/)
Seek incremental, rather than exponential, increases in allied contributions to offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces overseas. Abandon seeking to make a profit off (2/)
of US forces stationed overseas, linkages between those contributions and U.S. troop levels, and insulting language toward our allies.
Resume combined military exercises with South Korea when COVID-19 conditions allow. Cancelling and curtailing exercises gained (3/)
Resume combined military exercises with South Korea when COVID-19 conditions allow. Cancelling and curtailing exercises gained (3/)
no reciprocal diplomatic or military gestures from North Korea.
Maintain conditions-based wartime operational control transfer. Prematurely transitioning to a South Korean command of CFC —before Seoul has addressed deficiencies in C4ISR and ability to conduct (4/)
Maintain conditions-based wartime operational control transfer. Prematurely transitioning to a South Korean command of CFC —before Seoul has addressed deficiencies in C4ISR and ability to conduct (4/)
combined operations and the North Korean nuclear threat has been reduced—could have detrimental consequences in wartime.
Try to ameliorate strained relations between America’s critically important northeast Asian allies as the Obama Administration did. (5/)
Try to ameliorate strained relations between America’s critically important northeast Asian allies as the Obama Administration did. (5/)
North Korea. Return to a traditional “bottom up” bureaucracy-based and expert-based policy formulation and diplomatic outreach to North Korea. Future U.S.–North Korean summit meetings should be predicated on substantive progress at lower levels. (6/)
Continue to press for working-level diplomatic meetings with Pyongyang. Unfortunately, North Korea has rejected repeated US attempts at dialogue.
Insist on a detailed, comprehensive road map to denuclearization. The accord should clearly delineate (7/)
Insist on a detailed, comprehensive road map to denuclearization. The accord should clearly delineate (7/)
necessary actions by all parties, linkages to benefits to be provided, sequencing, and timelines for completion. Require a robust verification protocol in any agreement.
Condition a peace agreement on reducing the conventional force threat. (8/)
Condition a peace agreement on reducing the conventional force threat. (8/)
The U.S. and South Korea should not sign a peace treaty until the North Korean nuclear threat is eliminated and the conventional threat reduced.
Make human rights an integral component of U.S. policy, including filling the vacant (9/)
Make human rights an integral component of U.S. policy, including filling the vacant (9/)
Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights position. Downplaying North Korean human rights violations is antithetical to U.S. values.
Recommend discussions on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). As was the case in agreements between NATO and (10/)
Recommend discussions on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). As was the case in agreements between NATO and (10/)
the Warsaw Pact, CSBMs can reduce tensions and the potential for miscalculation and conflict by augmenting transparency and notification procedures for military exercises and deployments.
Reduce sanctions when the triggering activity has abated. (11/)
Reduce sanctions when the triggering activity has abated. (11/)
U.N. sanctions and U.S. punitive measures are responses to North Korean violations. U.N. sanction restrictions on North Korean economic activity may be reduced in response to progress on regime denuclearization. However, some unilateral U.S. targeted financial measures, (12/)
such as those defending the U.S. financial system, are law enforcement measures rather than diplomatic measures and should not be abandoned.
Respond promptly when North Korea violates U.N. resolutions. The Trump Administration ignored North Korea’s (13/)
Respond promptly when North Korea violates U.N. resolutions. The Trump Administration ignored North Korea’s (13/)
record number of missile violations in 2019. Any future North Korean violation, particularly a nuclear or ICBM test, should trigger a decisive U.S. response.
The United States must always remain open to diplomatic engagement and negotiations. (14/)
The United States must always remain open to diplomatic engagement and negotiations. (14/)
Over the years, the United States has tried diplomatic engagement, humanitarian assistance, security guarantees, sanctions relaxation, summit meetings, and reducing allied military deterrent, all to no avail. (15/)
Washington must maintain a strong military deterrence and continue to enforce U.S. laws until Pyongyang has taken necessary steps to reduce its nuclear threat to America’s homeland and those of its allies. (16/16)
