My post at @monkeycageblog applies a comparative perspective to US politics: breaking ties between politicians and armed actors can be hard - but monitoring, consistent enforcement, & political sanctions, ideally from those close to perpetrators, can likely help. @UCBerkeley 1/N https://twitter.com/monkeycageblog/status/1353296742729592833
The piece draws on work that @pstanpolitics and I did for @ForeignAffairs in the fall to assess the current involvement of armed actors in US politics: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/guest-pass/redeem/i0L7FqvAT7s (also covered for the NYT Interpreter by @amandataub & @Max_Fisher ) 2/N
The work draws more broadly on theory that @pstanpolitics and I developed from comparative case evidence in @PoPpublicsphere on how and why armed groups participate in different forms in elections: https://politicalsciencenow.com/how-and-why-armed-groups-participate-in-elections/ 3/N
And, on cross-national data that I collected on when armed groups participate directly in elections, which I wrote about in @JPR_journal https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343316668390 4/N
This research together shows that armed actors often have incentives to influence elections, and that politicians can also at times benefit from these relationships, unless costs are imposed - still questions about how, but I point to some ideas here: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/24/paramilitary-groups-helped-storm-capitol-heres-what-we-know-about-armed-groups-politics/ N/N