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I want to take a moment and reflect a bit on this piece that came out today on counter-terrorist financing (CTF) and highlight a few themes and implications for counter-terrorism writ large and our current (shifting) threat environment. 
https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/01/Handbook-ch-14-Davis-FINAL.pdf
https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/01/Handbook-ch-14-Davis-FINAL.pdf
I assert in this piece that CTF is an effective means of counter-terrorism because it reduces the funds available to terrorist groups, cells, and individuals. But is this true? I think so, based on my experience, but the evidence to support this hypothesis is thin.
This is not just a problem in CTF. The policies and practices of counter-terrorism writ large are rather lightly supported by empirical evidence. And yet: we pour millions (billions?) of dollars into counter-terrorism globally, to the detriment of other policies & programs.
This is a huge problem. There's been a push for evidence-based policy making, but it seems to only be selectively applied. So to get to the bottom of this, I'm exploring the effect of CTF policies and practices in more detail for my dissertation. We need a lot more of this work.
In this piece I also introduce an analytic framework I developed for my forthcoming book on terrorist financing. It expands the raise-use-move-store model to include managing and obscuring funds. Why is this important?
To design good policies, we need to be PRECISE in our language of what is happening. We can't just say something like "terrorism is financed by cryptocurrency". We need to be precise: terrorists and extremists move money through crypto, and raise that money from donations. (e.g)
We need to think about how terrorists manage their money, and the kinds of financial tradecraft that they use to do so. I talk a bit about that here, but there'll be more on this soon. https://www.projectcraaft.eu/research-briefings/new-technologies-but-old-methods-in-terrorism-financing
I also hint at another typology I've developed: the multiple ways that terrorist financing is countered. CTF isn't just about criminalization or regulation of the private sector, although these are two large components.
CTF is also about kinetic strikes (as @ColinPClarke notes in his work on this topic) and other non-kinetic approaches like technical assistance, exploiting financial intelligence, sanctions and financial exclusion.
This is also important because how do you critique something if that thing is so poorly defined? You risk ignoring many of the components. This is probably the number 1 problem with critiques of CTF to date, and has seriously hampered innovative policy development.
I also build on a distinction that exists in the CTF literature but isn't nearly well enough developed: the difference between organizational and operational financing. There is a LOT of daylight between how groups and cells and individuals finance their activities.
The scope, scale and mechanisms involved are quite different. And yet: globally, we have one CTF policy approach. We need different tools and approaches to counter different types of terrorism, and this needs to be extended to its financing.
(think: is Al Qaeda financed the same ways as Oath Keepers, Attomwaffen, the Base, for instance? Is Hizballah financed the same way as an ISIL lone actor attack?) The policies and practices are largely the same for very different problems.
Finally (and I know I've gone on too long), I also talk about terrorist adaptation to CTF policies and practices. Again, this is a hypothesis. My experience tells me it's a thing, as does some of the academic literature on terrorist adaptation. ( @DrMichaelKenney)
If terrorists are adapting, how effective can policies and programs be that were developed twenty years ago, before the advent of financial technologies, cryptocurrencies, social media, etc? Not good, friends. Not good.
