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"PRC Assertiveness in the South China Sea: Measuring Continuity and Change, 1970–2015" - new article @Journal_IS
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec_a_00400 read on below for a summary thread
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec_a_00400 read on below for a summary thread
Why has China alarmed its neighbours and risked military conflict in pursuit of its vast disputed claims in the South China Sea? I argue the answer lies in long-term patterns of continuity and change in China’s policy
Conventional wisdom says it's just about China's expanding power -- but the expansion of the PRC's sweeping claims there, and many of its boldest moves, happened back in the 70s and 80s when it was weak
There's no shortage of alternative arguments -- insecurity, resources, rising domestic nationalism, zealous frontline agencies, Xi Jinping, the list goes on. Problem is, there's no agreement on what exactly has changed in the PRC's policy, and consequently when.
Some date the SCS push back to the GFC 2008/09, others point to Xi Jinping's ascent in 2012, or various other dates. Without clarity about exactly what has changed and when, it's hard to assess the why, because the PRC's been doing new things there almost every year since the 70s
So the first task of the article is to develop a framework for assessing change in state behaviour in these kinds of maritime/territorial disputes. It does this by distinguishing between 4 kinds of assertive acts - declarative, demonstrative, coercive and use of force
Next, we apply this to a time series dataset of 130 cases of change in PRC behaviour in the SCS each year from 1970 to 2015. And we get this result: constantly increasing assertiveness; surges in '73, '87 and '92; and then a real program shift from 2007
See the cluster of red bars on the RHS - thats the introduction of regular coercive acts, alongside an administrative buildup of patrols & then island-building. Those basic outlines of China's policy, which I'd argue persist to this day, start from 2007 - before GFC & before Xi
What does explain these patterns, then? The last part of the article provides focused case studies of the 4 turning points apparent in the data: '73, '87, '92 and '07. The first three were largely opportunistic responses to favourable geopolitical circumstances.
By contrast, the major policy change observed from 2007 traces back to decisions in the late 90s to build long-range maritime law enforcement fleets. It was the maturation of these specific capabilities, rather than mil/econ hard power per se, that produced the change in 2007.
Going a step deeper, at each of the 4 turning points we find the PRC’s engagement with emerging Law of the Sea regime resulted in intensified pursuit of control over vast maritime spaces, where previously the PRC's interest had basically been limited to small disputed islands.
So there's a story here about the internalization (and reappropriation, as seen in the PRC's recent attempts to defy the UNCLOS) of international normative frameworks, and how this might under at least some circumstances prompt conflictual behaviour, rather than just cooperation.
Policy-wise, the article suggests (obviously) skepticism regarding PRC claims that its assertiveness is a response to external provocations, such as when Beijing deployed anti-ship cruise missiles to the Spratly Islands in 2018, citing FONOPs) by the US Navy.
But it also suggests officials should be cautious about attributing assertive acts to other-directed motives like undermining their deterrence credibility or weakening alliances. What appears—or feels—like a targeted move may be just another step toward a stated long-term goal.
There's plenty more nerdy stuff on the conceptual and empirical details, and on the dynamics of maritime disputes, but the thread's already getting too long - hopefully the article will be ungated soon. And thanks to @MorganLKaplan and team for a great editing job.
