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A thread on very interesting NFU mechanism: For a long time, people have doubted the credibility of a no-first use (NFU) declaration. Only India and China have a declared policy of NFU, both with declaratory and non-declaratory caveats. Generally NFU = not so credible. 1/ https://twitter.com/nukestrat/status/1353728224073809922
Keeping warheads de-mated from delivery vehicles is one way of ensuring some level of credibility to an NFU posture. Both India and China maintain this practice. The Soviets, who once had a declaratory NFU policy, did practice de-mating of warheads (Blair, 1993). 2/
De-mating raises the question of what do you do when you have a canisterized mobile missile or an SLBM or even a aircraft with a nuclear payload on stand-by? One way is to maintain strict civilian launch authority through procedures and physical constraints. Still not clear. 3/
For the U.S., one suggestion has been to introduce a two-person rule. Currently, POTUS has the sole authority to launch nukes (very well outlined by @ArmsControlWonk and @BrunoTertrais). But the two-person rule sort of mixes concepts of launch authority and NFU. 4/
Betts and Waxman present an argument for a three-man type rule where both SecDef and Attorney General must give approval. This certainly has an NFU-like effect but unclear when put in a scenario where pre-emption necessary. https://nyti.ms/2KLhrWu 5/
Important to note that sole-authority and high-readiness of U.S. nuclear forces was born out of the fear that command and control might fail in case of an attack from an adversary. Bruce Blair's 1993 book on perfectly outlines this development (also his 1985 book). 6/
The proposal made by @SenWarren and @SecDef19, which codifies NFU by seeking Congressional approval. Certainly adds more credibility to a possible American NFU. China has probably has a similar process as put by @Fiona_Cunning, under control of CMC and Politburo. 7/
The Soviet Union also had institutionalized such a process (Blair, 1993). Haven't come across any material which talks about parliamentary oversight of nuclear forces in India. 8/
My main question: How will NC3 adapt if the U.S. declares NFU and requiring Congressional approval? 9/
