While military planners are not prescient for assuming future war, major powers almost uniformly assumed a coming conflict prior to WW1 and WW2 - if not earlier in say The Franco-Prussian War.

It's easy to see parallels between this and our shift to Great Power Competition - and some of them are apt. There is a lot that "rhymes" between pre-WW1 Germany and China, or Imperial Japan and the PRC.

If a war arises, I don't think that future historians will find it surprising. They'll be able to form coherent narratives to the point where such a war is inevitable.

But there are other factors at play. The Cold War was an example where two great powers did not fight directly. This is attributable to nuclear weapons, which absolutely play into GPC with China.

The other side of the coin is that the tactical and operational challenges faced by China are HARD.

We like to complain about wicked problems, but we very much deliver them to any adversary - particularly with our capabilities for what's considered conventional armed conflict.

An invasion of Taiwan would perhaps be the most complex amphibious operation ever considered by any military.

And the socio-economic/political ramifications of conflict in the SCS, Taiwan, or Senkakus are extremely chaotic.

China is modernizing the PLA - and this is worrisome - but they are having a much more difficult time modernizing the PLA's culture.

Which is to say that war isn't inevitable. While future historians may benefit from the clarity that contingency provides, they will likely miss this if war does indeed arise.

Some lessons, though, from those major conflicts:

The sense of inevitability can be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

War usually happens earlier than planners anticipate.

All sides fair fare worse than they expected (ignoring the Franco Prussian War, because I can).